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ABSTRACT 
 
Higher education equity policies have for as long as they have existed provoked serious 
legal controversy, especially in the largest system of higher education, i.e. the USA. In 
as much as these legal troubles have not arisen (yet) in Ghana, it can’t be taken for 
granted that such problems are far-fetched. In that sense this study is a work ahead of its 
time; in drawing analogies from American case Law, the work attempts to predict the 
possible legal issues that may arise in the Ghanaian jurisdiction and the possible legal 
solutions. It does this in the context of the Gender affirmative action policy and the less 
endowed School policy implemented by the University of Ghana. 
 
To achieve this broad goal, the work proceeded by identifying the main features of these 
policies, the rationale for their adoption and the procedures for their implementation. 
Within an analytical framework of the filter model, carved out of the tenets of 
sociological jurisprudence, the project, using a legal methodology, evaluated the legal 
merits of these policies against the standards set by the Constitution of Ghana, as well 
as the Narrow tailoring analysis and Instrumental test evolved by American 
Jurisprudence. 
 
After carefully examining the legal literature as well as policy documents available, it 
was discovered that the two policies as implemented are bereft of the crucial standards 
of fairness and non-discrimination required by the constitution and therefore have weak 
legs to stand on in Law. It was also discovered that the procedures for their 
implementation are not sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass the legal test.  For these 
reasons, the work ends by suggesting ways of improving such policies to make them 
more legally passable. 
                                                                                                                              6 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
From the context of the home of a polygamous Man with competing wives and sets of 
children, to the office of the admissions board of a University with competing applicants 
of different backgrounds, the question of who gets what, when, and how, rears its head.  
Laswell (1950) writing from a system level perspective calls this problem politics, but 
viewed more closely; this problem represents the sum total of the many struggles we face 
even in our individual lives.  
 
In the educational context, pressures here and there, for equal opportunities, equal access, 
and fair treatment have led to the evolution of certain principles by higher education 
institutions to guide them in their admission decisions. Central to such principles has 
been the principle of equity.  For most institutions, equity behavior offers the most 
appropriate way of meeting the demands of equality and fairness exerted by society (see 
for example, Preamble to admissions: University of Ghana Handbook: 2005-2007).  
 
Ironically, the equity measure evolved by institutions has tended to deepen the problem 
inherent in distributing educational opportunities. The great number of disputes generated 
in the educational context by equity policies as will be discerned later in this study 
mirrors this fact. The source of the problem appears to lie in the concept of equity itself – 
in the name of equity, one stands the danger of “robbing Peter to pay Paul”. In providing 
an answer to this huge conceptual difficulty, the Law provides caveats and a framework 
within which equity-like policies should be understood and the equity rationale be 
assessed. For the legal mind, how much one gets, may not be much of a problem as 
compared to why one gets it, and how one gets it. Put simply, it is the principle of 
fairness and reasonableness that guides the action that may bother the legal mind. On the 
contrast, fairness or social justice may guide an equity policy, but not fairness as 
understood in the legal sense but as understood in the moral or political sense. Springing 
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from the perspective of Law, this work has the purpose of examining critically the legal 
basis of the less endowed Schools policy, and Gender affirmative action policy 
implemented by the University of Ghana.  More specifically, the work will legally 
appraise the objects of the policies and the procedures for their implementation.  To 
achieve this purpose it is important to start with conceptual and legal clarifications.  
1.2 THE NATURE OF EQUITY 
Broadly viewed, the term equity as used in higher education discourses, represents 
strategies and procedures for enabling and encouraging groups underrepresented in 
higher education institutions, and programmes or study areas to be granted access and to 
exit successfully. 
Skilberg et al (2000, p.10) make a very important distinction between equity and equality 
in the following words: “Equity does not necessarily connote equality. It does not 
represent an attempt to use precise measures to ensure fairness – for example fixed 
mathematical quotas for underrepresented groups or proportional representation 
although as strategies these may be attempted. Nor does it simply imply uniformity 
whether of institutional provision or entry and study requirements. On the contrary, it is 
now widely accepted that rather than sameness, substantial diversity and fitness to 
individuals and groups and their circumstances are appropriate if the varied needs of 
students are to be met”. In sum, Skilberg asserts that equity policy must take into account 
individual differences and needs.  
Also relevant to a conceptualisation of equity has been the concept of access. Equity and 
access, though complementary and even supplementary, do not connote the same 
meanings. Equity being a wider concept refers to the nature of access opportunities or 
procedures and to fair and reasonable treatment including opportunities for 
underrepresented groups not only to enter, but to progress well in higher education (Ibid). 
Thus equity represents a package of policies which includes fair access. 
In relation to human rights, the concept of human rights provides partly the philosophical 
and legal justification for the whole point of equity (Turner, 2006). Non discrimination 
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clauses in human rights conventions have always provided a basis for rationalising 
equity-like responses. Thus, human rights as a concept are only a tool for ensuring and 
enhancing equity. For purposes of social science research, Skilberg et al. (2000) advocate 
that the term equity should serve as an umbrella term for terms such as access, equal 
opportunity, equality of outcomes, and affirmative action.  
Drawing much inspiration from the neat conceptual clarifications by Skilberg et al., this 
work will view equity as the sum total of policies and procedures for ensuring fair access 
and reasonable treatment for underrepresented groups in the University of Ghana. Thus, 
equity is used in relation to policies relating to access. The term equal opportunity as 
employed in this study will not come with the expectation that all will be treated exactly 
in the same manner or that there should be precise equality of representation in all areas 
of higher education, but it will imply being systematically fair to the extent that even 
when inequalities occur, they will be justified by overall benefits and gains to all 
concerned.  
1.3 EQUITY THEMES IN THE GHANAIAN POLICY LANDSCAPE 
The dominance of equity-like themes in the Ghanaian constitutional and legislative 
framework can’t be overlooked. Much of such themes are expressed through the 
inclusion of non discrimination clauses in legislations or making special provisions for 
vulnerable groups in society in policy documents. 
The 1992 constitution of Ghana provides a clear illustration of this phenomenon. At  
Article 35 (6) the following provision is made “Towards the achievement of the 
principles of national integration the government should take appropriate measures to 
achieve reasonable regional and gender balance in recruitment and appointment to 
public offices”. 
The above clause follows from article 35 (5) which entreats government to prohibit 
discrimination and prejudice on the grounds of place of origin, circumstances of birth, 
ethnic origin, gender or religion, creed or other beliefs. 
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Offering further strength to these provisions is article 17 (2) which provides “nobody 
should be discriminated against on grounds of gender, race, colour, ethnic origin 
religion, creed or social or economic status”. Beyond the Constitution, the pervasiveness 
of equity tones in the Law is not far fetched.  Notable legislations that carry this policy 
are among others, the Education Act (Act 87). This Act provides at section 1 that “No 
person shall be refused admission as a pupil at any school on account of the religious 
persuasion, nationality, race, or language of himself or either of his parents”. 
The labour Act of Ghana (2003) provides further evidence to this trend. At Section 46 it 
provides “Special incentives shall be provided to employers who employ persons with 
disability”. Section 2 provides that special incentives shall be given to a person with 
disability engaged in a business or enterprise. Adding to the above provisions, section 63 
provides that a person’s gender, race or disability, among other things, should not be a 
basis for the termination of his or her employment. 
1.4 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
 
Equity-like policies all over the World have being a source of strong legal, political and 
social debate. In the American jurisdiction, ever since the decision of the Supreme Court 
in Regent of the Univ. of California v. Bakke stated that a university could take race 
into account as one among a number of factors in student admissions, affirmative action 
programs in student admissions and financial aid have come under several attacks. The 
preponderance of litigation over affirmative action policy can be explained by the fact 
that it manifestly conflicts with non discrimination clauses enshrined in the constitution.  
In the University of Ghana, traditional equity-like considerations were restricted to 
mature candidates and the disabled (Ofosu, 2006). These groups were admitted under a 
special admission regime, which allowed them entry under relatively less competitive 
conditions. However, following the introduction of more controversial equity-like 
policies, such as the gender based affirmative action policies of the early 1990’s and the 
less endowed Schools policy in 2004, difficult problems can be envisaged. Taking a cue 
from affirmative action policies in the USA where equal protection clauses provided for 
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in the 14th amendment have often times been invoked to challenge such policies, one can 
foresee similar clauses in the Ghanaian constitution being invoked in the future to 
question the legal basis of such policies. The 14th Amendment to the American 
Constitution and article 17 (1) of the Ghanaian constitution bear similar language. Article 
17(1) of the Ghanaian constitution states: “a) all persons shall be equal before the law. B) 
A person shall not be discriminated against on the grounds of gender, colour, race, 
ethnic origin, religion, creed, or social or economic status”. The fourteenth amendment 
also asserts equal treatment to all persons irrespective of colour, religion, or gender. It 
can be inferred that the protection granted by such clauses is not partial, but holistic and 
thus, relying on such clauses, both advantaged and disadvantaged groups may be able to 
seek relief in the courts in instances where they are discriminated against in the delivery 
of social services.  
A greater problem is presented by the fact that the courts in Ghana have in recent times 
shown great activism towards the review of policy decisions and executive decisions of 
the university. The Case of Ex’parte Professor Edward Ofori Sarpong, presented in 
appendix 1, is illustrative. It is against this background that the present study examines 
the possible legal challenges that equity-like policies of the University of Ghana may 
encounter and prescribe possible ways of avoiding such difficulties. Thus, the interest of 
the present study can be reduced into one specific problem: 
 How legally valid are the rationale(s) and procedures for implementing equity like 
policies in the University of Ghana? 
1.5 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY  
From the foregoing discussions, it is clear that the equity rationale and its related 
concepts find deep expression in the policy agenda of Ghana. Bearing this in mind, the 
present study will explore the scope of these policies, the rationale for their adoption, the 
process and procedure for their implementation and more importantly, the legal 
constraints that such policies may evoke in the future. To achieve these broad purposes 
the work by way of objectives, seeks to answer the following questions.  
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1. What are the major features of equity-like policies at the University of Ghana? 
 
2. To what extent are the rationales for these policies legally valid? 
 
3. How legally valid are the procedures for their implementation? 
 
4. In what ways can equity policies be improved? 
 
1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
The present academic enterprise will clearly be of both theoretical and practical value. In 
the theoretical sense, this study represents a novel attempt to explain equity-like concerns 
in Ghanaian higher education within the framework of a legal methodology.  
 
There exist similar works on equity in Ghanaian Higher education, such as Ofosu (2006), 
but the approach is based purely on a social science methodology.  For this reason, a legal 
approach to the problem offers a valuable alternative perspective for understanding 
equity policies in Ghanaian higher education. 
  
Furthermore, the work provides a deeper understanding of the role of Law in social 
stability and change through an analysis of theoretical discourses on the interface 
between law and higher education policy. The researcher in this regard, introduces the 
filter model as another way of conceptualising the relationship between Law and society. 
Thus, offering a very novel approach to understanding the issues of stability and change 
in Higher Education. 
 
Also, by way of significance, there exist a paucity of literature that examines legal issues 
in Ghanaian higher education, by drawing insights from analogous jurisdictions. This is 
the first of its kind. In that sense, this work provides a useful model for future researchers 
who will be interested in a comparative study of Ghanaian Higher Education Law. 
 
Even more importantly, Researchers in other developing countries with similar legal 
systems, similar history, and similar higher education systems: such as Uganda, Nigeria, 
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and Tanzania can use this study as a starting point for investigating into the possible 
higher education legal issues that are likely to arise out of the implementation of equity 
policies in their respective jurisdictions and systems. 
Also, in the theoretical vein, this work sets an agenda for an interdisciplinary discussion 
on the problem of equity in higher education, since it does in many ways combine legal 
analysis with social science concepts. In this respect, Sociological jurisprudence: a 
branch of legal thought interested in the interaction between Law and Society provides 
the analytical model for the study. 
In a practical sense, this study will provide a basis for shaping policies on equity in the 
future. It will do this in three ways. First, it will clearly spell out the various legally 
problematic features of the Equity policies of the University of Ghana. This will be done 
by drawing attention to loopholes in the policies, as manifested by the Constitution, 
Legislation and Case Law. It is strongly contended that clearly identifying the problem, is 
a key step towards solving the problem. 
 Secondly, the work will offer suggestions or solutions to the problems envisaged, by 
providing alternative approaches to the drafting and implementation of these policies, 
taking into consideration standards required by Law, as well as best practices evolved by 
other higher Education systems. It is anticipated that these suggestions will be useful to 
higher Education Institutions in Ghana in the development of their equity policies.  
 Thus, to make the findings of this work useful, the conclusions of the study will be 
incorporated into policy briefs and disseminated to the Higher Education Ministry, 
Higher Education Agencies, Higher Education Institutions, and other Stake holders. 
These Include but is not limited to: The Higher Education Division of the Ministry of 
Education, The National Council for Tertiary Education, The National Accreditation 
Board, The Council for Vice Chancellors and Principals, The University Teacher 
Association of Ghana,  The Polytechnic Teachers Association of Ghana,  and the 
National Union of Ghana Students.  In the long run, this work will prevent unnecessary 
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legal battles that would have arisen in the future as a result of potentially problematic 
equity policies, thus preventing wastage in the allocation of resources. 
1.7 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY 
The researcher divided the study into six chapters.  The first chapter opened with a 
general Introduction and Background to the study. In this section, the nature and scope of 
equity policies in Higher education were explored and their legal implications were 
generally discussed. Also the term “Equity” and its related concepts were put in its proper 
context. Chapter one closed with an examination of the purpose and objectives of the 
Study as well as the Significance of the Study. 
The second chapter is dedicated to the Review of relevant literature. The first part will 
provide an analytical framework for the Study with an emphasis on the filter model as a 
means for understanding the Relationship between Law and Social Change/Stability. 
Also in this section, relevant provisions in the constitution of Ghana as well as relevant 
Case law decisions, largely emanating from the American jurisdiction will be reviewed.  
The third Chapter focuses on the Methodology for the study. Here, attention is given to 
the various tools of statutory Construction, the Case Law approach and Canons of 
documentary Interpretation.  In the fourth chapter, the various equity like policies at the 
University and their mode of implementation are presented with the aid of tables. In 
chapter five, the equity policies, of interest in this study, are discussed in the context of 
information in the preceding chapters. Finally, conclusions are drawn in chapter six and 
suggestions made based on the analysis and discussions in chapter five. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
                                               
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
As a model for analysis, sociological jurisprudence helps us to construe the function of 
Law in society by attempting to establish a link between Law and Society. Early 
proponents of this school of thought, such as Roscoe Pound, define Law as a tool for 
social engineering (Ocran, 1978). Shedding light on what he means by social 
engineering, he asserts that Law enables just claims and deserts to be satisfied by 
balancing various social interests (Ibid). In following this thinking, conservative 
perspectives of the sociological jurisprudence look at how law mirrors or records social 
phenomena, or how law tinker changes in the legal system in a casuistic manner. A very 
useful departure from this approach is the Brake – accelerator model offered by Ocran 
(Burg 1977, p.508). In his conceptualisation, not only does Law defined in a proactive 
sense tinker changes through case Law, but it can indeed accelerate change through the 
science of legislation. Illustrating this point further, he asserts that change borne out of 
case Law is often slow and incremental, but legislation provides a more radical approach 
to social change (Ocran, 1978). 
 
The function of Law as a brake can be understood in various senses. In Ocran’s thinking, 
the stabilising function of the Law offers the best understanding of Law as a brake. In 
other words, Law may hinder social change in order to safeguard the legitimate 
expectations of individuals. The emphasis in this regard is the fact that Law must offer 
security to people who expect a certain element of social stability to achieve their goals. 
Ocran refers to the change vs. stability roles of Law as a paradox and prefers that the 
paradox is resolved in favour of change (Ibid). In his view the preference for social 
stability by individuals should not override the benefit inherent in overall societal 
transformation. 
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In Said’s thinking, the paradox needs rather to be resolved in favour of stability, but not 
stability understood in the Ocran sense (Said, 1982). To him, in discussing stability, the 
emphasis must be on the principle of legality as a whole which is a key element of every 
legal system. This principle expresses certain key ingredients which must necessarily 
inhere in any legal system and whose absence must automatically trigger a brake of 
policy or change impulses. Understood in that sense, Said argues that the brake function 
even becomes more imperative as compared to the change function, not just because it 
serves individuals legitimate expectations, but because it sustains the foundations of the 
legal system. Said goes a little further by setting out some of these key ingredients of 
legality. He notes them as fairness, due process, equality of treatment, non-discrimination 
and clear standards of behaviour without whim or caprice. These components of the 
principle of legality in his view must be construed by the courts according to Law.  In the 
context of equity policies, the principle of legality is defined given regard to the rules of 
constitutional construction and the various tests evolved by the courts. 
 
Drawing particularly from Said’s conceptualisation of change and stability, it is possible 
to predict the behaviour of the courts using a filter model which I propose as an analytical 
framework for this study. The filter model proceeds on the view that change impulses 
(policy) from institutions aimed at social change are filtered by a legal test to assess their 
validity as instruments of social change. The legal test is primarily the principle of 
legality as construed from the constitution and the narrow tailoring and instrumental tests 
evolved by the courts through case Law. By this model, whether or not individual goals 
should take precedence over societal goals or otherwise should be determined by Law. 
Where the purposes or content of equity policies fail the legal test, the Law shows 
preference for the status quo ante, therefore the policy is blocked and the system is 
stabilised. Where the courts condone the merits of a policy, the policy is allowed to effect 
the changes it carries. This framework assumes that there is a proactive and unbiased 
judiciary that is ready to subject policies to a rigorous legal test. It also assumes an active 
civil society which is ready to put these policies to a legal test through the courts. It must 
be admitted that this model ignores the social and political factors that may or may not 
influence change and stability. It only looks at Law exclusively as a stabilizer or a change 
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agent. Social change is used in this context to refer to changes in legal relationships in 
society, specifically rights, duties and privileges. It must also be admitted that not all 
forms of changes have legal implications. In other words, not all forms of policies evoke 
legal issues, and must therefore pass a legal test before causing its intended changes. It is, 
however, submitted that since equity-like policies touch on rights they necessarily 
provoke legal issues and must therefore conform to the Law before they can cause their 
intended changes in society. 
 
Figure 1 attempts to illustrate the relationship between Law and Society within the 
context of the so-called filter model, developed for this study. In the diagram below, 
change represents social change and stability represents social stability. Society is defined 
as any system of human interaction and policy is defined to exclude hard law. The Law in 
the middle is used to refer to the principle of legality as construed by law: specifically, as 
construed by the rules of statutory construction, the narrow tailoring test, and the 
instrumental test. 
 
  
Figure 1: The Filter Model Showing The Relationship Between Law and Society. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Law 
Stability Stability 
  Change 
Equity Policies 
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In the model above, equity policies proceed from change agents, in this context the 
University, directed at causing changes in society. The Law serves as a filter, evaluating 
the validity of these policies as tools for social change. Policies that fail this test are 
rejected and that restores the system to the status quo ante, or a state of stability. Change 
occurs when equity-like policies conform to the principle of legality set out by Law. 
Change indicators are represented by the red arrows. 
2.2 APPROACHES TO EQUITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
 
The focus of this section of the work is to plough through the general system and 
institutional level interventions that are employed in implementing equity-like policies in 
various jurisdictions. 
2.2.1 Legislation and Statutes 
 
By this approach, specific provisions are made in the constitution or in other Legislations, 
allowing affirmative action policies within Institutions. The Ugandan Constitution, for 
example, endorses equity-like behaviour of public institutions. Article 33 (5) of the 
Ugandan Constitution (1995) stipulates “Without prejudice to article 32 of this 
Constitution, women shall have the right to affirmative action for the purpose of 
redressing the imbalances created by history, tradition or custom”. This provision in no 
small measure provides a Constitutional stamp to affirmative action policies thus making 
it less likely for such policies to raise legal questions.   Article 32 (1) of the Ugandan 
Constitution further consolidates affirmative action policies.  
 
It states “Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the State shall take affirmative 
action in favour of groups marginalized on the basis of gender, age, disability or any 
other reason created by history, tradition or custom, for the purpose of redressing 
imbalances which exist against them”. This clause serves as a Claw-back excluding the 
application of non-discrimination Clauses in the Ugandan Constitution to Affirmative 
action policies. 
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Other notable cases include the case of India. The 1950 Constitution of India, for 
example, stipulates up to 15% reservation in higher education for the Scheduled castes (a 
notable disadvantaged group), and 7.5% reservation for the Scheduled tribes (also a 
predominant excluded group). In 1951, the First Amendment Act made certain changes in 
Article 15(4) of the Indian Constitution; the Right to Equality for all citizens was 
guaranteed (Gupta, 2006). This amendment empowered the state to make any special 
provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward class in India. 
In the 104th Amendment Bill (93rd Amendment Act) a new clause, 15(5), was inserted 
into Article 15 of the Indian Constitution that guarantees the ”right to equality” and 
“equal protection before law” to all citizens without discrimination (Ibid). The new 
clause allows the government to reserve seats for the Scheduled castes, Scheduled tribes 
and other backward classes in private unaided educational institutions except in the 
minority institutions (Ibid). It also forms the legal basis for extending reservations for the 
Scheduled castes, Scheduled tribes and other backward classes in all central and 
prestigious professional colleges up to 49.5% (Ibid).   
 
The Higher Education Act 101/1997 of South Africa, replacing all previous legislation 
pertaining to higher education, establishes and regulates a single co-ordinated higher 
education system in South Africa (see: Institute of Education London: Working paper 2). 
In the Preamble, the Act promotes the redress of past discrimination, ensuring 
representivity and equal access and promotes the values that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom (Ibid).   
It must be admitted that the Legislative approach, despite its clear advantage of providing 
a strong legal backing to affirmative action policy has its own limitations. Most notably, 
it makes changes within Institutions dependent on legislative changes. Put differently, in 
instances where Institutions have to shift their policies to reflect changing social realities, 
they will have to wait for changes in Legislation before such shifts can be made. 
Flexibility of Institutional policy becomes even more thwarted when such legislations are 
entrenched provisions and require cumbersome amendment procedures. 
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2.2.2 Soft Law Approach 
 
Institutional level equity-like policies are sometimes informed by policy guidelines or 
policy objectives at the system level, what can be generally referred to as soft Law. A key 
example is the case of South Africa where equity-like goals as stated in the national white 
paper and other system level policy documents provided an institutional drive for equity. 
(See: Education White Paper 3 - A Programme for Higher Education Transformation, 15 
August 1997). The White Paper, when addressing the needs and challenges facing higher 
education in South Africa, identified, inter alia, a key deficiency - that an inequitable 
distribution of access and opportunities exists for students and staff along lines of race, 
gender, class and geography. “This includes gross discrepancies in participation rates 
from students from different population groups, indefensible imbalances in ratios of black 
and female staff compared to whites and males and equally untenable disparities between 
historically black and white institutions in terms of facilities and capacities.” (para.1.4.1) 
The White Paper envisions a transformed, democratic, non-racial and non-sexist system 
of higher education (para.1.14). The White Paper also identifies principles that should 
guide the process of transformation in higher education, i.e. the principles of equity and 
redress (para.1.18), democratization (para1.19) and development (para1.20). Though not 
explicitly referring to gender equity, nonetheless gender equity underpins the intent of the 
Ministry in this regard. Specific reference is made to the replacement of the previously 
fragmented higher education structure with a single, coordinated system, with the 
purpose of broadening the social base of higher education with reference to race, gender, 
class and age. It is intended that such a system will become increasingly representative of 
the racial and gender composition of the South African population. This document, 
furthermore, makes provision for the legislative framework of higher education that will 
be established by the Higher Education Act of 1997 (Para. 3.11).  In a nut shell, the 
document is an expression of the political will for change in higher education. The soft 
Law approach clearly has the advantage of enhancing Institutional flexibility, in cases 
where policy has to be changed quickly to reflect changing social realities. Its 
disadvantage however, lies in its inadequate legal force as compared to Legislation. 
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2.2.3 Quota Approach 
 
 This approach has been employed both at institutional level and system level with the 
objective of curing the gender imbalance in the composition of students attending higher 
education. Even though it can come in the form of legislation or soft Law, its main focus 
is to create a reservation or quotas for a specified group thus, its name. An interesting 
case study in this light is Sri Lanka. Its national legislation, sanctions a quota policy for 
admission to higher education Institutions in order to ensure a fair representation of all 
districts in higher education. Under an All Island Merit Criteria, up to 40 per cent of the 
available places is filled according to marks obtained by candidates, ranked on an all 
island basis. Under a District Merit Criteria, up to 55 per cent of the available places in 
each course of study is allocated to the administrative districts in proportion to the total 
population (i.e. ratio of the population of the district to the total population of the 
country). A special quota of up to 5 per cent of the available places in each programme of 
study is allocated to 13 educationally disadvantaged districts in proportion to population: 
ratio of the population of each such district to the total population of the 13 districts. 
(See: Institute of Education London: Working paper 2). The quota approach is seen as a 
distributional strategy to ensure fairness in the distribution of the national cake. 
 
2.2.4 Critical Mass Approach 
 
The rationale for this approach is similar to that of the Quota. The only point of departure 
is that whilst the quota sets a fixed ratio of spaces that must be filled by a particular 
category of a disadvantaged group, the critical mass approach does not have an upper or 
lower limit. Its objective is simply to ensure by whatever standards a fair representation 
of the disadvantaged group in every admission period. What constitutes a critical mass 
may therefore vary from year to year. The critical mass approach appears to have been 
justified under certain conditions in the case of Grutter v. Bollinger which is discussed 
below. The procedure for enrolling a critical mass may also differ. For example, in 
Uganda the bonus points system is applied (Chivaura, I: 2000) whilst in Ghana, the cut 
off points system is used. 
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2.2.5 Financial Incentives 
 
This approach focuses on the use of financial schemes to correct the imbalance in the 
representation of various classes or groups in higher education. The incentives are 
tailored at the disadvantaged group in order to motivate them to participate in higher 
education. It takes the form of bursaries, grants and loans. In Ghana, for example, special 
scholarships are given to applicants from less endowed schools to enhance their 
participation in higher education (UG special reporter, v.44). Though not on a consistent 
basis, scholarship schemes targeting needy girls have been used in Malawi; in 1987-1988, 
the Human Resource and Institutional Development project implemented a scholarship 
scheme for girls in Malawi studying science related disciplines (Mlama, 2001). 
As a Conclusion to this section, it must be noted that it is possible to have a hybrid 
Intervention to the problem of equity in Higher Education. One or two or more of the 
above stated approaches can be used as equity solutions in Higher Education. 
2.3  LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR EQUITY LIKE POLICIES IN 
GHANA 
 
This section does two things. First, it provides a constitutional basis for equity-like 
policies in Ghana, and second, it attempts to run through the extent of the University 
powers with respect to the making of equity-like policies. 
 
The constitution of Ghana provides significant rules that bear upon equity-like policies. 
The preamble to the 1992 Constitution of Ghana in itself espouses the ideals and 
principles of equity where it states: “We the people of Ghana, In exercise of our natural 
and inalienable right to establish a framework of government which shall secure for 
ourselves and posterity the blessings of liberty, equality of opportunity and 
prosperity………… do hereby adopt, Enact and give to ourselves this constitution”.  
The key phrase equality of opportunity, used in the preamble, is worth noting. This 
standard set by the preamble establishes equity and equity-like concerns as an underlying 
principle of the constitution. It is, however, worth noting that the constitution does not 
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define what it means by equality of opportunity. Indeed equality of opportunity is in the 
practical sense limited by various social, cultural and political realities. 
 
Article 17(2) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana imposes a duty on the university not to 
base policies on discrimination. It states, among other things, that a person shall not be 
discriminated against on grounds of gender, race colour, ethnic origin, religion, creed or 
social or economic status. The constitution, however, does well to define what 
discrimination constitutes. At article 17 (3), discrimination is defined as follows: 
“For purposes of this article, “Discriminate” means to give different treatment to 
different persons attributable only or mainly to their respective descriptions by race, 
place of origin, political opinions, colour, gender, occupation, religion or creed, whereby 
persons of one description are subjected to disabilities or restrictions to which persons of 
another description are not made subject or are granted privileges or advantages which 
are not granted to persons of another description”.  
What constitutes different treatment is however very problematic and remains a matter 
for constitutional interpretation. Also, this article has the potential of being useful to both 
the advantaged and disadvantaged in society. Equity-like policies that tend to favour the 
disadvantaged in society can be contested as constituting discrimination. 
 
The directive principles of state policy lay down certain values and ideals on which the 
Constitution is grounded. At article 35(3) and (4) it is provided: 
“The state shall promote just and reasonable access by all its citizens to public facilities 
and services in accordance with Law”.  
“The state shall cultivate among all Ghanaians respect for fundamental human rights and 
freedoms and the dignity of the person”.  
However, the directive principles of state policy in themselves are not justiceable and 
constitute political aspirations, thus the effect of the directive principles of state policy in 
relation to the assertion of equity-like rights is not well made. 
At article 37 of the Constitution, the social objectives of the directive principles of state 
policy are laid. It is provided that “the State shall endeavour to secure and protect a 
social order founded on the principles of freedom, equality, justice probity and 
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accountability ……… and in particular the state shall direct its policies towards ensuring 
that every citizen has equality of rights, obligations, and opportunities before the Law”. 
The phrases used in the last sentence of this clause mirror the tone and effect of the 
preamble and therefore suffer a similar fate – They provide a wide room for the judiciary 
to exercise its discretion. 
 
The Constitution further gives powers to individual citizens to invoke the courts’ 
jurisdiction on matters that bear on equity-like policies.  
Article 23 sets out as follows “Administrative bodies and administrative officials shall act 
fairly and reasonably and comply with the requirements imposed on them by Law and 
any persons aggrieved by the exercise of such acts or decisions shall have a right to seek 
redress before a court or other tribunal”.. The standard of fairness and reasonableness is 
further illustrated in article 296 of the Constitution of Ghana which states “Where in this 
Constitution or in any other law discretionary power is vested in any person or authority- 
a) That discretionary power shall be deemed to imply a duty to be fair and candid; 
b) The exercise of that discretionary power shall not be arbitrary , biased either by 
resentment, prejudice or personal dislike and shall be in accordance with due 
process of Law; and 
c) Where the person or authority is not a judge or other judicial officer, there shall 
be published by constitutional instrument or statutory instrument, regulations that 
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution or that other law to 
govern the discretionary power.” 
 
The combined effect of articles 23 and 296 is to put parameters on the exercise of 
discretionary power by administrative bodies. In other words, such bodies are to operate 
within the caveats of fairness and reasonableness in the design of their administrative 
decisions. The clauses are however short of what constitutes fairness and reasonableness. 
 
Regarding the power to make equity-like policies, legislation exists that empowers the 
University to make equity-like policies. At section 15 of the 1961 University of Ghana 
Act, power is conferred on the University to make statutes for the smooth running of the 
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University. At section 10 of the same Act under the heading general powers of the 
university council, it is provided   “Subject to the provisions of this Act, the University 
Council shall have power to do or provide for any act or thing in relation to the 
University which it considers necessary or expedient in its capacity as the governing 
body, and the conferring of particular powers on the Council by other provisions of this 
Act shall not be taken to limit the generality of this section”.  
It is however worth noting that such powers are not immune from the review jurisdiction 
of the courts as will be discussed later in this chapter.  
 
The University of Ghana in giving effect to section 15 of the 1961 Acts has promulgated 
statutes to guide it in the running of the University. At section 15 (1) of the statutes of the 
University, it is provided “In addition to the functions specified in this Act, the council is 
responsible for determining the strategic direction of the University, monitoring their 
implementation, and ensuring the creation and maintenance of an environment that 
creates equal opportunity for the university regardless of age, disability, ethnicity, gender 
or creed”.  
This provision, like many other similar provisions referred to earlier on, fails to define 
what constitutes equality of opportunity, and such general terms used in legislation give 
room for uncertainty and provide a basis for the exercise of wide judicial powers. Also, 
actions taken under the authority of this enactment can in itself be declared by the Courts 
to be inconsistent with the constitution and therefore void as will be discussed in the 
subsequent section. 
 
2.4  CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF COURTS REVIEW POWERS AND 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS OF ACTION 
 
The 1992 Constitution of Ghana makes it possible for individuals to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the courts in any matter concerning his or her fundamental human rights.  
At article 33(2) it is provided “The high Court may issue such orders or directions or 
writs including writs of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus prohibition and quo 
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warranto, as it may consider appropriate for the purposes of enforcing or securing the 
enforcement of any of the provisions on the fundamental human rights”.  
In other words prerogative writs can issue against any institution in matters where an 
individual is able to prove an infringement on his rights to a court of competent 
jurisdiction. The power of the courts to review administrative and executive functions is 
further strengthened in subsequent clauses of the constitution.   
At Article 141 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, for example, supervisory jurisdiction is 
granted to the high court to review decisions of all lower adjudicating bodies to the extent 
that such decisions are deemed to be unconstitutional or ultra vires.  
 
At  article 126 (4) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, the superior courts are vested with 
the powers to issue such orders as may be and directions as may be necessary to ensure 
the enforcement of any judgement, decree or order they may give. These orders include 
habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and quo warranto. Such orders are for 
the purposes of enforcing or securing the enforcement of any of the provisions on the 
fundamental human rights and freedoms. The courts Act of Ghana bears similar 
provisions. At section 5 of the Act, it is provided: 
“The Supreme Court shall have supervisory jurisdiction over all courts and over any 
adjudicating authority and may in the exercise of that supervisory jurisdiction, issue 
orders and directions including orders in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, 
mandamus, prohibition and quo warranto for the purpose of enforcing or securing the 
enforcement of its supervisory power”. 
The case law is replete with standards that may trigger the courts’ powers of judicial 
review. In the celebrated English Case of Associated Provincial Pictures Ltd and 
Wednesbury Corporation, it was suggested that to qualify for judicial review of an 
administrative decision, the decision maker must be authorised by public law to make an 
administrative decision, which had the consequence of depriving a person of some 
benefit or advantage of which he had been assured that such benefit or advantage will not 
be withdrawn without first been given an opportunity to advance the reasons why the 
benefit or advantage should not be withdrawn. On the question of grounds justifying the 
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grant of judicial review, the court adopted the following criteria “illegality”, 
“irrationality” and “procedural impropriety”. 
Irrationality was defined as an outrageous decision which defies logic or accepted moral 
standards which no reasonable person applying his mind to the question for determination 
would have reached.  Procedural impropriety was defined as (a) failure to act with 
procedural fairness (b) failure to observe the basic rules of natural justice or (c) failure to 
observe procedural rules expressly laid down by the legislation which has conferred the 
jurisdiction on the decision maker even when the observance of such failure did not lead 
to any “denial of natural justice”.  
 
The Ghanaian Case of The Republic Versus 1) The University of Ghana 2) The Acting 
Vice Chancellor University of Ghana. Exparte (1) Prof. Edward Ofori Sarpong (2) Prof. 
Kwesi Agyeman illustrates one clear instance in which the courts may apply the 
standards set by the Wednesbury case to review the decisions of the University. The facts 
of the case as extracted from the head notes are set out below:  
 
Following leakages and alleged malpractices at the University of Ghana in the course of 
the 2004-2005 academic year examinations, a committee was set up to investigate these 
allegations. After the investigation, a disciplinary board was set up for senior members of 
the university. The first applicant Prof Ofori Sarpong was Pro-vice chancellor of the 
University while the second applicant was head of the philosophy department. The 
disciplinary board invited the applicants to respond to allegations of misconduct 
levelleled against them. After their appearance before the disciplinary committee a report 
was issued by the committee that found them culpable of the allegations. The committee 
recommended that sanctions be imposed on them. Purporting to act on this 
recommendation, the Vice Chancellor wrote letters to the first and second applicant 
dismissing them from the University with immediate effect. In their actions for judicial 
review of the decisions of the Vice Chancellor, Counsel for the first applicant (Pro-Vice  
Chancellor) argued that the procedure used by the Vice Chancellor to remove the 
applicant sinned against section 7(7) of the statutes of the University, which states “The 
provisions on the removal of the Vice Chancellor shall apply to the removal of the Pro-
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Vice Chancellor”. At section 6 (19) (b) (c) and (e), the procedure for the removal of the 
Vice Chancellor is stated as follows: 
 
“A petition for the removal of the Vice Chancellor shall be presented to council and 
served on the Vice Chancellor and Council shall determine whether the petition merits 
any further attention - where council determine that the petition raises issues that may 
satisfy the good cause provisions of 6(19 a) , It shall set up a five member committee to 
investigate the matters raised in the petition (e) Both the petitioner and vice chancellor 
shall be given the opportunity to be heard in the deliberation of the committee. (f) 
Council reserves the right to accept, partially accept, or reject the recommendations of the 
committee.”  
The court took the opinion that by dismissing the Pro-vice chancellor without due 
recourse to the proper procedure stated in 6(19) it clearly sinned against the statutes of 
the University of Ghana and therefore triggers a review on the part of the Courts. 
Regarding the second applicant, Section 40 and 23 of the University statutes states that 
disciplinary action for senior members must issue from the academic board of the 
university and not the Vice Chancellor. By the Vice chancellor therefore, arrogating to 
himself the power to dismiss senior members of the university without the concurrence or 
sanction of the academic board, it sinned against the relevant sections of the University 
statutes. 
 
The court made the following observation to support it stance “It is this courts view that 
by purporting to consider the decision of the disciplinary board endorsing their 
recommendations and applying the sanctions, the Vice chancellor was obviously acting 
ultra vires, he usurped the powers reserved to the academic board: short circuited the 
procedure, and thereby deprived the second applicant the chance of having his case 
reviewed by the appropriate body.  This would therefore fall under justification for the 
grant of judicial review on the rounds of procedural impropriety. In order not to sound 
repetitive I will say that my discourse on procedural impropriety and the authorities cited 
when discussing the removal of the first applicant Professor Ofori Sarpong applies 
equally to the second applicant.”  This tone assumed by the court expresses clearly the 
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sanctity that the courts attach to natural justice principles even in the face of University 
autonomy. 
 
Does it therefore mean that the court will be inclined towards reviewing every university 
decision or policy? Can the University oust the jurisdiction of the court on certain issues 
that are of purely an internal nature, or are purely policy decisions? Is the court a 
veritable octopus stretching its hands and legs everywhere? The answer to these questions 
is not a simple yes or no. There have been instances where the courts have simply 
refrained from intervening in the purely internal decisions of the university. 
 
In the case of Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing, for instance, the USA 
Supreme Court concluded that “it was ill equipped to evaluate the substance of the 
multitude of academic decisions that are made daily by faculty members of public 
education institutions – decisions that require an expert evaluation of cumulative 
information and are not readily adapted to the procedural tools for judicial decision 
making.”  
Similarly, in the case of Grutter and Bollinger, which will be discussed in detail below, 
the court noted that it was ill equipped to ascertain “what race neutral alternatives will 
allow an institution to assemble a highly qualified and richly diverse academic class”.  
 
These decisions appear to support the sometimes hesitant approach that the court may 
adopt in its review of the internal policies of the university. It is however important to 
understand the Ewing case in its context. Administrative decisions that are purely of a 
professional nature can be distinguished from ones that entangle legal issues such as 
fairness, equity, etc. For example, deciding on which student’s statement of purpose is 
most qualified for admission may fall in the former category and is a purely professional 
act. On the other hand exercising discretion as to which group of students male or female 
should be granted financial incentives for their education is another kind of decision 
which might evoke legal issues, to which the court will not necessarily apply the Ewing 
formula. 
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2.5  ATTITUDE OF THE COURTS TOWARDS EQUITY LIKE POLICIES. 
 
American courts have on a case by case basis attempted to evolve useful guidelines for 
the evaluation of equity-like policies. In their evaluations, the courts have paid much 
attention to the purpose of the policy, and the procedures for its implementation. Below is 
a discussion of the outstanding approaches developed by the courts in their evaluation of 
such policies. Cases involving Race and gender are presented in tandem in this section 
because: (1) these two issues appear ejusdem generis in non-discrimination clauses and 
are therefore likely to be understood and constructed in the same manner (see for 
example: Article 17(2) and (3) of the 1992 constitution of Ghana), (2) they evoke similar 
issues (group rights concerns versus Individual rights concerns) in litigations.  
2.5.1 Narrow Tailoring Test   
 
In applying this test, what the court seeks to do, is to ensure that the so-called equity-like 
policy places as light a burden as possible on non-beneficiaries. The seminal case of 
Regents of University v. Bakke constitutes one of the earliest formulations of this 
approach. The facts of the Bakke Case, in so far as material are presented below: 
Bakke filed suit claiming that minority candidates with lower qualifications had been 
admitted to medical school under a program that reserved spaces for “disadvantaged” 
applicants.  
The California Supreme Court ordered the school, the State-run University of California, 
to admit Bakke. The university then appealed to the United States Supreme Court. A 
divided Supreme Court affirmed the judgment ordering Bakke's admission to the medical 
school of the University of California at Davis and flawing the school's special 
admissions program. However, the Court did not stop the school from considering race as 
a factor in future admission decisions. Justice Powell delivered the Court’s judgment. 
Four justices agreed with his conclusions as to the Bakke case, and four other justices 
agreed with the ruling as to use of race information in the future. 
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The court stated clearly that a university could take race into account as one among a 
number of factors in student admissions for the purpose of achieving student body 
diversity.  The words of Justice Powell in the judgement appeared to indicate that the 
university admission policy could not survive scrutiny because it has a quota component. 
Thus diversity is not being used as one among several factors but a sole factor. It is 
important to note the following statement of Justice Powell: “the university's interest 
requires[s] a sufficiently diverse student body and . . . [while] fixed racial quotas and 
racial balancing are not necessary to achieving that goal, the consideration of an 
applicant’s race during the admissions process necessarily is.” 
It is clear from the statement above that clear caveats have been provided as to the 
procedure by which the equity-like policies should be implemented. The diversity 
rationale from the stance of this judgement can only be justified within the framework of 
an admission procedure that allows for the consideration of other factors.   
The first Hopwood decision presents a more explicit application of the narrow tailoring 
analysis: 
Four white applicants to the University Of Texas School Of Law filed a case in federal 
district court alleging that the Law School’s admissions policies were unconstitutional. 
Plaintiffs claimed that the Law School’s policy of placing black and Mexican-American 
applicants in a separate applicant pool and admitting members of those groups over non-
minority applicants with similar records sinned against the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that separate evaluations for minority 
applicants were unconstitutional because they were not narrowly tailored to the state’s 
compelling interest in diversity and in overcoming past discrimination. The court 
also held that giving minority students a “plus” is lawful, but was concerned about a 
separate standard for minorities and non-minorities. Hopwood v. State of Texas, 861 F. 
Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (Hopwood I).  
The first Hopwood decision points to the fact that the diversity rationale in itself must not 
constitute too much a consideration in the admission process so as to blur the significance 
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of other factors. Thus using separate criteria for different categories of students amounts 
to giving too much weight to the diversity criteria while other significant factors are 
ignored. 
In Johnson v. University of Georgia, a very radical decision by the District Court once 
again exposed the possible legal crevices in affirmative action schemes based on race and 
gender. This was a consolidated action by four white female students who pleaded that 
their application for admission has been rejected because of their gender and race. 
District Judge Edenfield, issued a ruling finding that the university admission policy was 
unconstitutional. The court ruled that under the equal protection clause diversity does not 
rise to a level of a compelling state interest because 1) There is no evidence that 
significant educational benefits can be collected from racial and gender diversity 2) There 
are no principled stopping points for taking race into account, and 3) that the argued 
compelling interest is based on stereotypes-namely that race and /or gender are a proxy 
for viewpoint or experience. 
In confirming the decision of the district court, the eleventh Circuit Court of appeals 
issued a decision setting out a criterion within which a narrowly tailored diversity policy 
must fall. These criteria are provided below in the form of questions: 
1) Whether the admission procedure uses race and gender in a rigid or mechanical way.  
2) Whether it fully takes account of race/gender neutral factors which may contribute to 
a diverse student body  
3) Whether the policy gives an arbitrary or disproportionate benefit to the members of 
the favoured class and  
4) Whether the school has genuinely considered and rejected as inadequate, race neutral 
alternatives.  
In the two Michigan cases discussed below, we see a much detailed exposition of the 
narrow tailoring analysis used in the Johnson case above in the Supreme Courts 
discussion. The facts of the case in so far as material are discussed below: 
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In the fall of 1997, two class action lawsuits were filed by the Center for Individual 
Rights on behalf of white students denied admission to the University of Michigan's 
undergraduate and law school programs. (Gratz v. Bollinger, et al. and Grutter v. 
Bollinger et al.) The suits alleged that the University utilizes different standardized test 
score/grade-point average standards for white and minority students, but the University 
countered that race is only one among a number of factors taken into account in its 
admissions processes. The admission guidelines assigned points to applicants for 
academic and non-academic factors, including race. The University asserted that the new 
system maintained its commitment to affirmative action and was under development 
before the lawsuit. The Center for Individual Rights (CIR) faulted the new system for 
making race too large a factor in admissions.   
The case was finally considered by the US Supreme Court as consolidated cases and the 
court decided as follows: 
The Court issued its Grutter decision first--a 5-4 decision written by Justice Sandra Day 
O'Connor. In it the Court endorsed Justice Powell's decision in Regents of the University 
of California v. Bakke, finding diversity in higher education to be a compelling state 
interest and upholding the law school admissions program. The Court noted the 
individuality of the review in the law school, and held that “race can be considered as a 
“plus” factor in admissions if it is considered in the context of a "highly 
individualized, holistic review of each applicant’s file, giving serious consideration to 
all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment.” 
The court particularly observed that the narrow tailoring analysis paid particular respect 
to the educational judgement and expertise of the Law school’s faculty and admissions 
personnel. 
Prior to the case getting to the Supreme Court the sixth circuit had heard the case and had 
in its judgement made a very important distinction which is worth mentioning. The 
distinction was made between a quota based policy and a policy that only aimed at 
enrolling a critical mass of disadvantaged people. The Court stated that any system 
aiming at diversity will have some bottom and top number of minorities, and simply 
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having an approximate range of minority students who are admitted each year does not 
turn the pursuit of a critical mass into a quota system. 
In contrast, however, the concurrent case of Gratz and Bollinger yielded different results. 
In a 6 to 3 decision, the Michigan undergraduate admission policy was struck down. The 
court found that the award of 20 points out of 150 to underrepresented minority 
applicants solely because of race is insufficiently “narrowly tailored to achieve the 
interest in educational diversity that respondents' claim justifies their program.”  
It appears from the decisions above that the narrow tailoring analysis applied by the 
courts, gives consideration to the following factors: 
a) Whether or not separate procedures, tracks, criteria or standards were used in the 
admission procedures for different categories of students as in the case of the first 
Hopwood decision. 
b) Whether or not the number and weight of affirmative action related criteria was 
too large as in the case of Gratz v. Bollinger. 
c) Whether the affirmative action programme sufficiently considers another means 
of achieving the same goal. 
2.5.2 Instrumental Test 
 
Under this test the court looks into the purposes of the policy. By so doing, it attempts to 
answer the questions: Does a problem exist in fact? If so, does the equity policy actually 
solve the problem? In applying this test, the policy rationale of remedying past 
discrimination has often being a subject matter of judicial discussions. The presentation 
below looks at how this test has been applied by the courts in the context of the 
“discrimination rationale”. 
2.5.3 Remedying Past Discrimination 
 
 In the famous Bakke case, Justice Thurghood Marshall justified this rationale when he 
observed: “Race could properly be considered in an affirmative action program, a policy 
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of taking positive steps to remedy the effects of past discrimination. …………In the light 
of the sorry history of discrimination and its devastating impact on the lives of Negroes, 
bringing the Negro into the mainstream of American life should be a state interest of the 
highest order. To fail to do so is to ensure that America will forever remain a divided 
society. I do not believe that the Fourteenth Amendment requires us to accept that fate.”  
 
The above observation appears to have received a further judicial endorsement in the 
Sixth Circuit ruling in the University of Michigan case in which it stated, among other 
things, that black and Hispanic students can intervene in the lawsuits to argue that the 
university needs affirmative action policies in place to remedy its own racial 
discrimination. 
In the first appellate decision by the fifth circuit in the Hopwood II case, the court laid 
down limitations of this rationale. It observed: “the applicable discrimination cannot 
be in the system in general, or the University as a whole, but must be specifically at 
the Law School”. In other words, this rationale can’t justify the blanket application of 
equity-like policies throughout the whole system.  
In Podberesky v. Kirwan, a more complex approach was adopted by the courts in 
evaluating the above rationale. In that case, a Hispanic student challenged a merit-based 
scholarship program that was reserved solely for African-American students. The 
university of Maryland established the plan as part of a desegregation plan to comply 
with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and as a way to attract and retain minority students. 
The court held that race-conscious remedial measures are constitutional only if 
there is strong evidence that remedial action is necessary, and that the action is 
narrowly tailored to meet the remedial goal. While the university argued that the 
program was designed to remedy past discrimination, the court disagreed, and held that 
the program was not narrowly tailored. The court ruled that it is not permissible for a 
college to rely on a poor reputation in the minority community or a racially hostile 
environment to show that the effects of prior discrimination are continuing. It stated 
“unless the college shows that this environment was caused by its own past actions 
and is not the result of general societal discrimination”. The Podberesky case appears 
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to place a firmer limitation on using the above rationale to justify affirmative action 
policy. This is because not only does it require the institution to point to general trends of 
discrimination in the society, but it also requires of the institution to point to its specific 
contribution to the discrimination in the past.  
 Also, in other jurisdictions and educational contexts, the above rationale has been very 
useful in justifying equity-like policies. A judicial stamp was given to affirmative action 
by the Indian Supreme Court in a 1963 historic decision. The Case, titled: Indira 
Sawhney vs. Union of India, represented a comprehensive discussion on the scope and 
purposes of affirmative action policies in India. In its analysis, the Supreme Court of 
India made a very interesting differentiation within the socially disadvantaged group.  
The court submitted that even where equity-like policies are targeted at a group or a class, 
belonging to the class perse is not a sufficient condition to benefit from the scheme. A 
prospective beneficiary must necessarily bring himself within the rationale or purposes 
for which the equity policy was instituted (Ibid). The court further upheld a 27% 
reservation for the so-called “Other Backward Classes”, but subject to the exclusion of 
the “creamy layer” or “socially advanced persons/sections of the OBCs”. Included in the 
“creamy layer” were the children belonging to Class I and Defense Officers and children 
whose parents had an income above Rupees 100,000 per annum. This limit was further 
revised in 2004 and extended to Rupees 250, 000 (Gupta, 2006).  
The New Economist examines the above rationale for equity-like policies and does an 
interesting critique of these policies in the following words “The goal of reservation in 
India has been to bring about an improvement in the welfare of those who, historically, 
have been economically and socially depressed. But in arriving at this judgment about 
who should be eligible for reservation, the criterion has been a person’s caste rather than 
his or her income or wealth. Consequently, groups belonging to what Article 115 of the 
Indian Constitution calls “socially and educationally backward classes” have benefited 
from reservation even though, in practice, many of these groups could not be regarded as 
“backward”.  
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This has meant that many of the benefits of reservation have been captured by well-off 
groups from the depressed classes (for example, chamars from the SCs) while poorer 
groups from the depressed groups (for example bhangis from the SCs) have failed to 
benefit” (New Economist, December 19, 2005). The above Observation exposes how 
group tailored equity policies may as well fail to achieve its intended outcomes. 
2.5.4 Overview of Chapter Two 
 The chapter opened with a discussion of the filter model as an analytical framework for 
the study. The core of the subsequent sections focused on the legal aspects of the filter 
model or what is referred to in the model as Law.  To this end, section 2.3 attempted to 
examine the principles of legality as enshrined in the 1992 constitution of Ghana focusing 
on non discrimination and fairness clauses and its possible effects on equity policies.  
Also, section 2.4 did a general discussion of the review powers of the Courts.  
Examined closely, the section affirmed the capacity of the Ghanaian Courts to act as a 
block where principles of legality are ignored in policy making. Thus, the section 
provided strong support for the filter model. In the final sections of the chapter actual 
judicial practice in relation to equity policies were examined. The two other important 
elements of the “Law” namely the narrow tailoring analysis, and the Instrumental test, as 
evolved by American jurisprudence were discussed. It became obvious that American 
Courts have applied a strict scrutiny approach to such policies.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
3. METHODS AND APPROACHES 
 
In line with the objectives of the study and the interest of the researcher, it is necessary 
that three major sources of data are analysed: Statutes, Case Law or simply put decisions 
of judges, and policy documents. To successfully do this, the legal method will be 
employed.  Three main reasons justify the adoption of the legal method. 
 
1. The method provides a mechanism for analysis and interpretation of judicial 
decisions as well as relevant legislation. 
2. It provides a standard for understanding the possible interpretation that the courts 
will give to university policies. 
3. It enhances the researcher’s ability to predict the possible behaviour of a 
Ghanaian court faced with equity-like questions that relate to higher education. 
 
Bearing in mind the above stated reasons and the objectives of this enterprise, the present 
discussion will specifically focus on: 
 
a) Rules of statutory interpretation: This will enable the researcher to take into account 
the possible considerations that will inform the interpretation of non-discrimination 
clauses in the constitution and other legal documents.  
b) Relevant case law: This will enable the researcher to draw relevant analogies from 
existing judicial decisions so as to effectively predict the behaviour of the courts when 
similar cases emerge. 
c) Rules of documentary interpretation: This will enable the researcher to construct the 
meanings and implications of policy documents using the appropriate canons of 
interpretation that the courts have devised. The overall effect will be to extract the 
rationale for such policies using the judicial standard. 
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Hereunder is a detailed discussion of the three main facets of the legal method that would 
be employed in the present study. 
 RULES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
 
Statutes, in the view of Farrar (1977) are the result of political bargaining arrived at 
through the adjustments of various social interests. In his view therefore, statutes must 
necessarily be intelligible because they must reflect social reality and consensus. 
Nevertheless, statutes are often time encumbered by the problems of the dynamism of 
language. Thus, without canons of interpretation, statutes may fall victim to irrational 
judgements and interpretations. Interpretation canons provide at the level of generality a 
framework for resolving the problem of semantics which may flow out of legislations. 
In the discussions that follow, the most notable canons of interpretation as identified by 
Buta (1995), a Ghanaian publicist, will be of interest. They are identified and discussed 
below. 
(1) Ascertaining the legislature’s intention: According to this approach, the legislature 
sets out to find the broad aims of a particular statute or the intended meaning or purpose 
of a particular statute. In Rugby water Board v. Shaw’Fox (1973) Lord Simon of 
Glaisdale described the position as follows “The task of the courts is to ascertain what 
was the intention of parliament, actual or to be imputed, in relation to the facts as found 
by the courts. There are a number of established canons of interpretation to assist the 
courts in ascertaining and applying the parliamentary intention. These canons have two 
aspects: first, as a code of communication whereby the draftsman signals the 
parliamentary intention to the courts and secondly, as the quintessence of what 
experience has found to be the best guide to parliamentary intention”. 
These two elements of interpretation canons identified by Glaisdale are illustrated as 
follows. In the first instance the courts may pay attention to reports of parliamentary 
proceedings prior to the passing of the bill, memorandum to the bill or other preparatory 
materials. The second instance relates to parliament’s own usages, customs and 
traditions. Useful as it may seem, the above approach appears to present serious problems 
as a rule of construction. One big criticism for example is: Who is to be taken as the 
legislature for this purpose? Is it simply the majority of the people present who voted for 
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the whole bill? Is it meaningful in any event to talk about their intention? When is the 
intention supposed to be ascertained – Is it at the date of the passing of the Act or can it 
be regarded as a continuing matter so that the words used can be understood in their 
current usage. These difficulties presented by the above approach make it less full proof 
as a tool for predicting the behaviour of the courts in the context of our discussions. 
3.1.1 The literal rule 
 
In R v. Inhabitants of Ramsgate, Bayley J, describes the literal rule in the following 
words “It is very desirable in all cases to adhere to the words of an Act of parliament, 
giving to them that sense which is their natural import in the order in which they are 
placed.”  
Thus, the literal meaning rests on the premise that there is generally a plain meaning and 
that it is the courts’ function to give effect to it even though the result is absurd or unjust. 
The courts who adopt this approach emphasise that the remedy against such absurdity or 
injustice lies in the hands of the legislature.  Suitable as this approach may seem, it fails 
to take account of the appropriate context in which the law was made. It also fails to 
adjust the law to social realities and purposes.  
3.1.2 The purposive approach 
 
This approach emphasises the instrumental nature of judicial interpretation. It proceeds 
on the assumption that judicial interpretation should reflect those constitutional ideals and 
values, such as the rule of law, human rights, constitutionalism, and the wider notion of 
development. A broad conclusion is reached that the purposive approach to constitutional 
interpretation appears to have gained ascendancy and that the supreme courts tend to 
spurn results that are suppressive of fundamental human rights (Law Faculty publication, 
2006). The purposive approach is however not without problems as it fails to answer the 
questions: Whose purposes should the law serve, who defines those purposes? And who 
determines those purposes? 
 
As a Conclusion to this section, it must be noted that notwithstanding the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of each of the approaches presented above, they individually 
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offer useful guidelines to the Ghanaian Courts in the exercise of their Interpretation 
function. 
3.2  CASE LAW ANALYSIS 
 
Analogies:  By this method, the work proceeds on the basis of a number of points of 
resemblance of relations or attributes between cases. In large measure, conclusions will 
be based not just on the number of attributes or relations which are found to exist in 
common, but also and more particularly on the relevance and importance of such 
attributes or relationships. Note should be taken of the fact that law being normative 
proceeds on the fact that because I know X and Y resemble each other in these ways, they 
ought to resemble them in every way and this should be governed by the same rule or 
principle. John Stuart Mills pointed out that the use of analogies in the sciences serves as 
mere guide post pointing out the direction in which more serious investigation should be 
done (Farrar:1977). In Law however, the process concludes not with an inference based 
on probabilities and further investigations, but with the use of the resemblance as a basis 
of a normative step. – The application of the old rule to the new case. 
 
In using the method of analogy, it is important to note that analogies will not only be 
drawn from Ghanaian cases, especially in instances where litigation has not arisen over 
the matter in the Ghanaian jurisdiction. For example, section 54, (7) of the Courts Act, 
1993, provides that decisions from other jurisdictions may be of importance to the 
Ghanaian courts in the exercise of their interpretation function. For purposes of clarity, 
the entire provision is reproduced below: 
 
“subject to any directions that the supreme court may give in the exercise of its powers 
under article 132 of the constitution in the determination of any issue arising from the 
common law or the customary law, the court may adopt, develop, or apply such remedies 
from any system of law whether Ghana or non Ghana) as appear to the courts to be 
efficacious and to meet the requirements of justice, equity, and good conscience”. 
Illustrative of this trend is the clear reliance of the reasoning in the American 
Constitutional case of Marbury V. Madison in the Ghanaian jurisprudence. In NPP v. 
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Attorney General, for example, the learned Ghanaian judge Adade (J.S.C.) quoted 
copiously the following extract from Marbury and Madison.  
 
“It is true that in the instance before us the interpretation of the court is not sought to 
enforce action by the executive under constitutional legislation but to restrain such an 
action under legislation alleged to be unconstitutional. But we are unable to perceive that 
this circumstance takes the case out of the general principles which forbid judicial 
interference in the exercise of executive discretion”. 
Thus as can be clearly seen, reliance on decisions from analogous jurisdictions is an 
accepted practice by the Ghanaian courts sanctioned by legislation. To this end, this study 
will draw analogies from decisions in the American jurisdiction to the extent that they are 
useful to the study. 
Another critical aspect of the case law technique to be used in this study is the fact that 
analogies will be drawn precisely from the ratio decidendi of the cases and not other 
extraneous material of judges such as the obiter dicta. What the ratio decidendi 
constitutes is presented in the next sub section.  
3.2.1Ratio Decidendi: It has been described as any rule of law explicitly or implicitly 
treated by the judge as a necessary step in reaching his conclusion, having regard to the 
line of reasoning adopted by him, or a necessary part of his directions to the jury (Lloyd, 
1972). It is simply defined as the reason or the reasons for the decision or as the 
underlying principle of a case which forms its authoritative element.  
Professor Goodhart attempts to provide some guiding principles for spotting the ratio 
decidendi. The guide lines are as follows:  
                                           
Good hart’s List 
 
1. The principle of the case is not found in the reasons given in the opinion. 
2. The principle is not found in the rule of Law set forth in the opinion. 
3. The principle is not necessarily found by a consideration of all the ascertainable 
facts of the case, and the judges’ decision. 
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4. The principle of the case is found by taking account of the fact treated by the 
judge as material and his decisions based on them. 
5. In deciding the principle it is also necessary to consider what facts were held to be 
immaterial by the judge for the principle may depend as much on exclusion as it 
does on inclusion. (See:  Farrar, 1977). 
  
It appears that in cases where the Interpretation of a statute was the issue or among the 
issues in a previous case, the court may apply the ratio in that previous case to a new 
case, so as to escape the difficult work of interpretation. In that instance there is a 
precedent on the interpretation of that particular statute so the court applies the precedent 
unless it is not bound by it as shall be discussed below. 
3.2.1  Stare decisis 
 
It refers to the detailed ground rules governing which courts bind which other courts in 
the legal system. In Ghana this is explicitly laid down by the 1992 Constitution and the 
Courts Act 1993. The stipulation simply put spells out three superior courts of judicature 
namely: The Supreme Court, the appeal court, and the high court with the Supreme Court 
being the highest, followed by the appeals court and the high court. A decision of the 
Supreme Court binds all other courts and must be given the utmost priority when any 
court resort to case law. The Supreme Court is not bound by its own previous decisions. 
In the absence of a decision of the Supreme Court on a matter, the decision of the court of 
appeal, binds all other courts below the court of appeal more precisely the high court and 
inferior courts. Likewise, decisions of the high courts, by way of precedence, binds all 
inferior courts notably circuit courts, and district courts and tribunals. 
 
Not only do the Ghanaian courts rely heavily on the priority of courts in their judicial 
interpretation, they also rely heavily on the priority of laws. Article 11 of the Ghanaian 
constitution lays down the hierarchy of laws as follows: 
“The laws of Ghana shall comprise  
a) The Constitution  
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b) Enactments made by or under the authority of the parliament established by 
this Constitution. 
c) Any orders Rules  and regulations made by any persons or authority under a 
power conferred by the Constitution 
d) The existing law  
e) The common Law.” 
 
The hierarchy above with the Constitution being the highest and the common law (largely 
case law, or judge made law) being the lowest, determines which law should be given 
priority when there is a conflict between the various sources of law outlined above in the 
legal system. Thus in line with this hierarchy, article 1 of the Ghanaian Constitution 
outlines “The Constitution of Ghana shall be the supreme law of Ghana and any law 
found to be inconsistent shall according to the level of its inconsistency be declared void” 
( 1992 constitution of Ghana) 
 
 
3.3  CONSTRUCTION OF DOCUMENTS  
 
In order to be able to achieve the objectives of this enterprise, another very important task 
of the researcher will be to predict the possible interpretation that will be accorded to 
policy documents having an equity-like rationale. This calls for an application of canons 
of documentary interpretation. 
In the Ghanaian case of Biney and Biney, the court of appeal laid down three basic rules 
of construction of deeds and documents namely:  
a) The construction must be gathered from the written document itself.  
b) The construction must be near to the intention of the author as the law will permit.  
c) Technical words of limitation will have their strict legal effect. 
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Bimpong Buta (1995) after following closely recent decisions adds a fourth: 
d) The document should be read as a whole so as to arrive at the true intention of the 
maker. 
The above outline is discussed below in seriatim 
a) The intention must be near to the mind and intention of the maker: The court must 
discover the true intention of the maker of the document and thus arrive at an 
interpretation that gives the document its real meaning. Consequently, if the courts find 
that the literal meaning of the words used would lead to absurdity, repugnancy or 
inconsistency, the court can modify the literal meaning so as to avoid absurdity and 
thereby reach an interpretation that will effectuate and will not defeat the author’s true 
intention. 
b) Intention must be gathered from the written document itself: This implies that we must 
look at the written expression of the maker of the document to ascertain the intention. 
The court must thus give effect to the intention as expressed; not what was intended to 
have been expressed. The court cannot as it were think for the parties and substitute the 
presumed intention for the expressed intention. 
c) Where words of limitations are used, it should be strictly construed: This applies 
mainly to the construction of deeds and therefore is not of much relevance to the present 
discussion. 
 
d) The document should be red as a whole: This point appears to have gained ascendancy 
in the construction of documents (Buta, 1995). It simply implies that the document 
should not be construed clause by clause or chapter by chapter but should be read 
together to ascertain the overall rationale or the underlying purpose of the document 
(Ibid). 
 
 
                                                                                                                              47 
3.4  LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
A clear limitation of this study lies in its nomothetic approach. In that the study is not 
based on an empirical understanding of the problem but on secondary data. It is therefore 
possible that there may be a gap between the information in policy documents and the 
real issues on the ground. In that regard the study addresses the problem at the level of 
generality but does not tackle specific issues that would have arisen out of a more 
practical case study. 
Secondly, the work is limited by the fact that it is based on an institutional case study. 
This limits the extent to which generalisations could be made from the conclusions of the 
study. Thus attempts at generalisations will have to take into account the uniqueness of 
the setting of the study. 
Also, data had to be gathered in pieces because relevant data needed for the study was 
scattered in various sources. There is no comprehensive database on University of Ghana 
equity policies. Thus, the author had to comb through minutes, books, administrative 
files, reports, official statements, etc. It is submitted that some of these sources are 
informal and could be contested as representing the final policy position of the 
University. 
The researcher also admits that there is a paucity of case law so far as equity-like issues 
in Ghanaian higher education are concerned. Much of the case law based on which 
equity-like issues will be discussed is based on the American jurisdiction. Even though 
this approach is legally justified, there may be strong methodological arguments that cast 
doubt on this approach. For example, the cultural understanding of equity as well as 
equity needs in the United States society may not necessarily be the same in the Ghanaian 
society. Also, policy considerations that inform the court decisions in the United States 
may be different from that of Ghana. However, notwithstanding the clear methodological 
weaknesses of such an approach, analogies from the USA jurisdiction provide at a 
general level a framework for understanding the possible behaviour of the Ghanaian 
courts within the framework of equity-like policies. 
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Another limitation of the study lies in the complexity that flows from establishing a 
relationship between Law and society.  The complex nature of social reality does not 
always lend itself to a quick evaluation with rules or a set of rules. Equity in the social 
context has so many policy dimensions which may not necessarily reflect themselves in 
rules of Law.  
3.5 CHAPTER OVERVIEW:  
In this chapter, the various tools that will be used in the analysis and discussions were 
identified. Moreover, the rules of statutory and documentary construction as applied by 
the Ghanaian Courts were identified and discussed. The method of analogy as a means of 
arriving at judicial conclusions was also considered. The object of these discussions was 
to provide an idea of how equity disputes will be analysed and examined by the Courts, 
and the considerations that may guide the Courts in arriving at conclusions. The chapter 
ended by outlining the limitations of the study. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
4. CONTENT OF EQUITY POLICIES 
 
This section seeks to present the various equity policies that exist at the University of 
Ghana within the context of the admission policies of the University. Data presented is 
restricted to undergraduate admissions for two reasons. First, undergraduate admissions 
constitutes 97.71% of all admissions to the University of Ghana (see: University of 
Ghana, Basic Statistics, 2006) and second these policies have not been applied to 
graduate admissions at the University (Ofosu, 2006). The emphasis will be on the 
rationale(s) for these policies as well as the procedures for their implementation.  
 To effectively do this, the section commences with a presentation of University of 
Ghana’s admission policy. 
  ADMISSION REGIME 
 
The admissions board at the University of Ghana is responsible for conducting all 
categories of admissions into the university. Section 41 of the university of Ghana 
handbook expresses this in clear terms as follows: 
 “The admissions board shall be presented with a list of all candidates for admissions for 
the board to decide which candidates may be offered admission and to which subjects… 
candidates who do not satisfy the admissions requirement are not eligible for admission 
and may not be considered by the admissions board”.   
To be presented to the admissions board, a person must have filled a University 
application form and must have satisfied the minimum admissions requirements. Two 
separate streams of admission are conducted by the academic board: the regular 
admissions, and the special admissions.  
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4.1.1  Regular Admissions 
 
Regular admissions as can be inferred from regulations 3:2:1 of the university handbook 
refer to admissions conducted, based on merit in the West African Senior Secondary 
School Certificate Examination (WASSCE) or the Senior Secondary School Certificate 
Examinations (SSSCE). A total aggregate of 24 in the above named examinations has 
been set by the University as the minimum requirement for admission into the University 
of Ghana. Details of admission requirements for regular students are set out in regulations 
3:2:1 as follows: passes in three subjects, i.e. English Language, Mathematics, and 
Integrated science, and three elective subjects. Additionally, science and engineering 
students are required to pass core social studies at least at grade E and non science 
students are required to pass integrated science at least at grade E. The aggregate score 
for the core and elective subjects should not exceed 24. 
At section 3:2:2 of the university handbook, a pass in the senior secondary school 
examinations is understood to mean a candidate’s performance at grades ranging between 
A and E, and is interpreted as follows: 
SSCE                                                                                 WASSCE EQUIVALENT 
A………………1 ………………Excellent                                A1 
B………………2……………….Very good                               B2 
C………………3…………..........  Good                                     B3 
D………………4…………………Credit                                   C4, C5,C6 
E……………….5………………….Pass                                     D6, D7, E8 
F........................................................Fail.......................................F9 
It must be reiterated that the cumulative aggregate of the applicant based on six subjects 
(Core and electives) should not exceed 24. 
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Cut-off points 
The University of Ghana irrespective of its minimum entry requirements sets up a 
minimum cut-off point for each admission year. A cut-off point is necessary because the 
number of students who meet the minimum entry requirement each year outruns the 
number of places available. For each programme, the extent of competition determines 
the cut-off point. To illustrate this trend the cut-off points for the 2005-2006 University 
of Ghana admissions are illustrated below: 
BSc (Administration)       - Aggregate 7/8 
BSc (Agriculture)      - Aggregate 16 
BSc (Science): 
Biological Science      - Aggregate 12 
Mathematical Science     - Aggregate 13 
Bio-mathematical Science      - Aggregate 13 
Physical Science      - Aggregate 13 
Engineering Sciences      - Aggregate 11 
Nursing       - Aggregate 10 
BA: 
General Arts       - Aggregate 15 
Science /Business/Vocational backgrounds   - Aggregate 9 
           
(For details see: Http://www.ug.edu.gh/announcementdetail.php?recordID=40) 
 
4.1.2  Other admissions 
 
Two categories of students constitute what is termed ‘Other admissions’ for purposes of 
the present discussion. These are the matured students’ category, and the concessionary 
admissions.  
Section 40 of the University of Ghana handbook sets out conditions for admitting 
matured students: Candidates aged at least 30 years who undergo a qualifying 
examination in English (essay comprehension, grammar and usage) and general paper 
(quantitative methods, critical and logical thinking and current affairs) may be considered 
for admission to the Bachelor of Science in administration and Bachelor of Arts 
programmes even if they fail to meet the admissions requirement set out under regular 
admissions above.  
                                                                                                                              52 
4.1.3 Concessionary Admissions 
This admission track is not provided for by the university handbook but flows from some 
of the other policy decisions of the academic board of the university (see appendix 2). It 
is an admission regime that serves as a reward system for persons in the service of the 
University; teaching and non-teaching staff. It allows for children and near relations of 
staff and faculty of the University of Ghana and sister Public Universities in Ghana, who 
do not meet the respective cut-off points under the regular admissions regime, but meet 
the minimum requirement of aggregate 24, to be admitted to various programmes in the 
university. For highly competitive programmes an applicant under a concessionary 
regime must fall just two points below the cut-off point. 
4.2 CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO EQUITY 
 
Very old equity-like policies have existed in the University, which according to Ofosu 
(2006) have sparked very little or no controversy for as long as they has existed. Notable 
among them is the Disabled policy, which allows for applicants who demonstrate a 
manifest disability on their application to be granted admission to various programmes on 
a less competitive basis. What in the view of this researcher appear capable of generating 
much controversy are more recent policies, namely: The Gender policy, and the Less 
Endowed Schools policy. The presentation below exposes the nature and scope of these 
policies. 
 
4.2.1 Gender policy 
 
The preliminary report of the inter-faculty committee to advise on policies and plans for 
the development of the University (1990-see appendix 2), constitutes a key component 
concerning the preparatory materials used in the formulation of the gender affirmative 
action policy. 
It recommended, among other things, a gender sensitive admissions policy that will take 
into account the under-representation of women in higher education (see appendix 2). 
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This report was approved by the academic board (The highest decision making body of 
the University) and has been a core component of the University’s admissions policy. 
The rationale of the policy as can be gathered from reading extracts from the report is as 
follows: 
 “Recognizing that girls are at a disadvantage socially and bearing in mind Dr. Aggrey’s 
famous dictum that “if you educate a man you educate an individual but if you educate a 
woman you educate a nation”, there is a need to have more educated women to serve as 
role models in the society”.  
Reading the document as a whole, it appears that the academic board sought to establish a 
relationship between general social discrimination against women and their under-
representation in higher education. In this vein the committee made reference to the 
following social disadvantages of women: 
A) Cultural bias against formal training of girls particularly at high levels of 
education. 
B) Early marriages and attendant maternal roles which disrupt education. 
On the surface of the document, the committee expresses the belief that institutional 
policy can be used as a tool of social change. To them, creating equity-like policies for 
women in higher education will offer a strong base from which to fight negative 
perceptions about women. Furthermore, widening access to women in itself has a 
developmental value (will lead to the education of the whole nation). 
Also glaring in the preparatory materials that informed the gender policy is the so-called 
balance/diversity rationale(s). These two rationales are presented together because in 
most cases balancing has been used as a tool for achieving diversity (see for example 
discussions of  the most recent affirmative action case decided by the American Supreme 
Court reported on   Friday  June 29th , 2007 edition of the Washington Post). 
 Most notable among these materials is the university rationalizations committee report 
which recommended a 50: 50 male-female ratio by the year 2000 (see appendix 2). The 
                                                                                                                              54 
male-female ratio as at 1989 as indicated by the university rationalization report was 
80:20 in favour of males.  
The above named rationale has recently been re-echoed by the Vice-Chancellor of the 
University of Ghana in the following words: “In the 2006/2007 academic year 5,600 
students registered. Out of this number, 42% of registered students were females, it 
means we are drawing closer to 50:50 female to male ratio……….For now we continue 
to use affirmative action to boost admission to undergraduate programmes” ( see: 
http://www.ug.edu.gh/content.php?recordID=176) 
 The gradual march towards this rationale can be best appreciated from a critical             
examination of the male-female representation in the 1980’s and early 90’s in   
comparism to that of 2006/2007, as has been shown in tables 1 and 2.   
 
 
 
Table 1:  University Of Ghana Enrolment by Gender (1980-81-1990/91) 
 
 
Year 
 
 
Gender  
1980-81 
students 
enrolment 
Gender 
Breakdown 
% 
1985-86 
student 
enrolment 
Gender 
breakdown 
% 
1989-90 
student 
enrolment 
Gender 
breakdown 
% 
1990-91 
student 
enrolment  
Gender 
Break   
down  
% 
Male  3,098 84 2,807 81 3,269 81 3076 76 
Female  607 16 645 19 771 19 976 24 
Total  3,705 100 3452 100 4,040 100 4052 100 
 
Source: Library of Congress /Federal Research Division/Country Studies/Area 
Handbook series p.4 (see: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ghana/gh_appen.html) 
 
Table 1, indicates the trend of representation of women in higher education in the years 
1980-81 to 1990-91. The trend shows a relatively low representation of women in higher 
education in the years under discussion. For example, in all the years under discussion the 
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representation of males in higher education was three times more than that of females 
(84:16 in 80/81, 81:19 in 85/86, 81:19 in 89/90, and 76:24 in 90/91). It is also interesting 
to note that within ten years, the trend of admission did not improve significantly with 
women constituting less than 25% of the total number of students admitted by 1990/91. It 
was for this reason that the urgent need for remedial measures became necessary.  
 
Contrastingly, the introduction of gender based affirmative action policy, have come with 
a remarkable increase in the overall representation of females in higher education. The 
table below shows the trends of representation in all programmes as at the 2006/2007 
academic year. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Under-Graduate Enrolment for all Programmes – 2006/2007 
 
 
Faculty/School Male  % Female % Total  
Arts/Social Studies  8731 56.0 6839 43.92 15570 
Agriculture & 
Consumer Science  
588 66.7 293 33.2 881 
Health Sciences  40 18.26 179 81.7 219 
Engineering  113 86.25 18 13.7 131 
Law (LLB) 142 59.41 97 40.58 239 
Business  814 59.85 546 40.14 1360 
Science 1826 65.28 971 34.7 2797 
Total 12254 57.8 8943 42.2 21197 
 
Source: Basic Statistics University of Ghana 2006/2007(Legon: Innolink Ltd) 
 
In the table above, it can be observed that the overall male-female ratio in the University 
of Ghana is closing up with barely 16 % difference. What must, however, be of interest is 
that the gap seems to be closing up more effectively in the Social Sciences and Arts than 
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in fields like engineering. For example whilst 86.25% of total number of students 
admitted for engineering are males, only 13.7 % are females, a difference of more than 
60%. On the other hand whilst 56% of total numbers of students admitted for the 
arts/social sciences were males, approximately 44% were females a difference of only 
12%.  This trend perhaps suggests that even if the improvement in female representation 
is attributed to affirmative action policies, it has not affected the system as a whole. 
Interestingly, there appears to be another interesting trend in the table above that shows 
extreme variation in male and female representation. In the health sciences, whilst only 
18.26% of the represented are males as many as approximately 82 % of the represented 
are females. This trend seems to show a differing interest pattern of males and females in 
their choice of courses. 
 
Another interesting variant of these trends that must be noted is that the overall 
proportion of female applicants admitted in the 2006 /2007 academic year by the 
University of Ghana is very close to the overall proportion of male applicants admitted 
(see Table 3). 
 
 
Table 3: Fresher’s Application, Admissions Statistics, 2006/2007 
 
 
Area of 
Study 
Students 
Applied 
Students 
Admitted 
Males 
Applied 
Males 
Admitted 
Females 
Applied 
Females 
Admitted 
Humanities 13794   7575   8338 4458 5456 3117 
Science   2936   1823   1658 1095 1278   728 
Agriculture     734     410     492   282   242   128 
Engineering     426     162     365   138     61     24 
Special 
Admissions 
    325     1114       85   875   240   239 
Total 18215   11084 10938 6848 7277 4236 
 
Note: Special admissions refer to Exchange students and Occasional studentships. 
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Source: Basic Statistics University of Ghana 2006/2007(Legon: Innolink Ltd) 
 
It can be gathered from the table above that out of 7277 female applicants to the 
University of Ghana in the 2006/2007 academic year, as many as 4236 were admitted. 
This represents 58.21% of the proportion of female applicants admitted. On the other 
hand, 6848 male students were admitted against 10936 numbers of applicants. This 
represents 62% of male applicants admitted. Comparing the two figures, there is only a 
five percent difference of male and females admitted to the University of Ghana in 
relation to the proportion of male and female applicants. What is more, females tend to be 
proportionally overrepresented compared to their male counterparts in admissions to the 
most dominant programme, i.e. the programme that admits the most students at the 
University of Ghana: the humanities (Arts and Social sciences). Whilst 4458 males were 
admitted for the humanities against an applicant pool of 8338 representing 53.5%, as 
many as 3117 females against an applicant pool of 5456 were admitted for the 
humanities. This represents 57.1% of the proportion of female applicants admitted.  Thus, 
table 3 presses further the point that the degree of gender representation in the University 
of Ghana is highly relative to programmes. 
4.2.2 Method of Implementation 
 
The implementation strategy employed by the University of Ghana to widen access to 
female applicants is very typical of the critical mass approach discussed above. In that, no 
specific quota is set for male and female enrollment. Conversely, admission standards are 
manipulated to favor women. Appendix 2 is illustrative; the cut-off point for admission of 
female applicants was proposed to be set two points below that of their Male 
Counterparts. Ofosu (2006) provides a graphical account of the cut-off levels for both 
genders (with the female cut-off point falling under the so called affirmative action 
programme) in the 2004/2005 academic year as follows: 
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Table 4: University of Ghana: Cut off points by Gender (2004/2005) 
 
Programme Gender Cut-off point 
Bachelor of Arts Male 15 
           “ Female 16 
   
Mathematical Sciences Male 12 
            “ Female 13 
   
Biological Sciences Male 11 
              “ Female 13 
   
 
The scheme above illustrates a one point/two point increase in the cut-off point in favour 
of female applicants. This shows that in practice the two points increase in favour of 
women as expressed in the policy document(see: appendix 2) has not been applied across 
board. Ofosu further observes that close to 400 female applicants benefited from this 
concession. He also observes that, close to 2000 applicants who met the minimum entry 
requirements could not be admitted for lack of space. 
 
 
4.3 LESS ENDOWED SCHOOLS POLICY 
 
Institutional differentiation at the senior secondary school level is a system level initiative 
that seeks to address the resource imbalance at the pre-tertiary level and address them 
holistically. To this end, the Ghana education service has identified 295 senior secondary 
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schools as less endowed schools. In its view, these schools require critical policy 
interventions.  
(see: http://www.knust.edu.gh/administration/vc_speeches). The criteria used for the 
selection includes, but is not limited to: 1) Strength of teaching staff in the school. 2) 
Teaching and learning resources available. 3) Location of the School. 4) Socio economic 
background of pupils, among others. (Ofosu, 2006) 
 
It is estimated that as at 1990 there were only 264 senior secondary schools in Ghana, By 
1993, 170 more schools had been added, first by absorbing and upgrading 140 existing 
community schools and then by creating new ones.(Ibid).  By the year 2000, close to 500 
senior secondary schools could be identified in Ghana offering various programmes. Of 
all these institutions, Ofosu cautiously observes that only about 50 are actually well 
endowed, and in relative terms (measured against international standards), less than 20 
are well endowed. 
  
It appears on the plain face of policy documents that the social justice argument is the 
strongest point for the less endowed schools policy. The previous Vice-Chancellor of the 
University of Ghana captured this fact in the following words “"The plain truth is that 
there are many applicants, who by virtue of the schools they attended would never 
experience university education if affirmative action is not applied to assist them. This is 
the motivation for our policy on admission for less endowed schools” (see: 
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/education/artikel.php?ID=67019). 
 
The policy commenced in 2004 after passing the approval of the academic board 
(appendix 2) and has since seen three batches of enrollments. 
 
National policy considerations also appear to have underpinned the social justice drive of 
the University.  In the Ghana poverty reduction strategy document a policy framework 
has been provided for mainstreaming the vulnerable and excluded in human resource 
development (GPRS 2, 2006-2009, p.54). To this end, institutions are mandated to 
strengthen the processes of empowering the vulnerable and excluded, to reduce their risk, 
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protect their rights, and enhance their contribution to national development. The 
document sees such policies as critical to economic growth and sustainable social 
development.  
 
4.3.1 Procedure for Implementation 
 
 Gathered from the face of the document, the less endowed school policy is executed 
through a quota regime and financial incentives.  The academic board sought to reserve 
300 spaces every year for students from less endowed schools (University of Ghana 
special reporter vol 43. No.9). It is worth noting that in practice the policy has resembled 
more of a critical mass approach than a quota scheme policy. Table 5 illustrates the 
pattern of enrollment of students under the less endowed schools policy.  
 
 
 
Table 5: Enrollments of Students from Less Endowed Schools                                 
 
Academic  year Number of 
students from  less 
endowed schools 
admitted 
Total number of 
students enrolled 
Percentage of 
students from less 
endowed schools 
enrolled 
2004/2005 230 8044 2.859 
2005/2006 280 6963 4.021 
2006/2007 153 5600 2.73 
Source: University of Ghana special reporter: Vol 43&44 
From table 5 we see a fluctuating enrollment pattern of students from less endowed 
schools. The quota of 300 spaces for such students has not been realized in any of the 
three admission years above. In the most recent admission year (2006/2007) just a little 
over half (153) of the quota was actually allocated to students from less endowed schools. 
No reasons have so far been issued publicly by the admissions board to explain this trend.  
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The year 2005/2006 represented the highest number of less endowed school students 
admitted so far: only 20 spaces short of the quota (280). It represented a gradual 
progression towards the 300 quota spaces as the previous year was 230. All in all, it 
appears that the quota scheme policy mirrors a gap between policy intentions and policy 
outcomes.  
Another essential feature of the less endowed schools policy is its scholarship 
component. Beneficiaries from this policy are assigned to a scholarship package that 
caters for their academic facility user fees. This implies that minus living expenses, the 
higher education of a student under this policy is virtually free. Novel as this scholarship 
regime may be, it still bears more of the characteristics of a needs based scholarship. 
Consequently, it establishes a link between the type of school attended and the extent or 
degree of need. 
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4.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY:  
This part of the work provided a detailed presentation of how the two equity policies 
under consideration have been implemented so far, and the justifications for their 
adoption. In all, five tables were presented. Table 1 showed the representation of women 
by gender from 1980/81 academic to 1990/91 academic year. It was observed that within 
these ten years period, there was no significant increase in female enrollment. In table 
two, we see a significant improvement in the overall   representation of women. We also 
saw patterns of overrepresentation and under representation of both genders, in various 
programmes: men were overrepresented in engineering, whilst women were over 
represented in the health sciences. There also appeared to be a closing gap between 
genders in their representation in the Arts and Social Sciences (Humanities). 
Table three presented data on the number of student applicants by gender in the 2006 
academic year and examines the proportion of male and female applicants who were 
actually admitted. It emerged that the proportion of female applicants admitted for the 
humanities was larger than that of male applicants. In table four, the cut- off points for 
various programmes by gender was presented. The objective was to provide a picture of 
how the policy has worked in practice.  Finally, table five gave the trend in admission of 
less endowed students. It was discovered that none of the three years of implementation, 
exhausted the quota for less endowed students.     
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
5. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
In this chapter, the emphasis will be on evaluating the various rationales and procedures 
that apply to affirmative action policies in the University of Ghana within the framework 
of the filter model. To this end, the objects and procedures of these policies will be 
measured against the requirements set by Law to ascertain its validity or otherwise. The 
chapter commences with an analysis of the gender policy justifications of the University 
of Ghana. 
 REMEDYING SOCIAL DISCRIMINATION: GROUP RIGHTS 
ARGUMENTS VERSUS INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS ARGUMENTS.   
 
Remedying social discrimination presents itself as a strong point in the gender policy 
justifications of the University of Ghana. Looked at more carefully, the justification 
provokes a serious legal trouble in legal jurisprudence. This has come to be known as the 
group rights versus the individual right debate (Lloyds, 1972). Put more contextually, it 
provokes the question: Should the rights of a class or group of people, in this case 
women, be held supreme over that of an individual who does not belong to the group? 
 
Group rights thinkers will respond in the affirmative. In their view, group interests 
supersede individual interests. Gender policy benefits women in general by providing 
more women the opportunity for education. Thinking in this line, non-discrimination 
clauses are interpreted to mean non-discrimination against a particular group such as 
women. To legitimize this thinking in the Ghanaian context, it is important to ask the 
question: Does the Ghanaian Constitution lends itself to the group rights approach to 
interpretation? This question is best answered in the light of article 17 (2) and 17 (3) of 
the 1992 Constitution of Ghana which features non-discrimination clauses. 
 
Article 17 (2) clearly adopts an individual rights approach. On its plain face it states “No 
person shall be discriminated against on the basis of gender, race, color………..” The 
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reference to person in this clause indicates an individual rights approach to constitutional 
construction. 
 
Making this view more convincing is the fact that article 17(2), falls under chapter 5 of 
the Constitution, which is a chapter on the fundamental human rights of the citizen. In the 
opening clauses of chapter 5, at article 12(2), it is stated “fundamental human rights of 
the individual contained in this chapter”. Once again there is a reference to the individual 
and not a group of individuals. Using a plain meaning perspective of interpretation it is 
clear that non-discrimination clauses herein are referable to the individual. 
 
It is also possible to come to the same conclusion if a more holistic approach is adopted 
towards interpretation. If 17 (2) is read together with 17(3) the context in which 
discrimination is used becomes even clearer. Article 17 (3) defines discrimination to 
mean giving different treatment to different persons by virtue of their gender, race, etc. 
Impliedly, any reference to group identity, to justify any form of preferential treatment, 
cannot be justified according to the Constitution. By  applying group rights thinking to  
policy making  and thereby providing preferential treatment to women, a key ingredient 
of the principle of legality has been breached – the principle of non discrimination. What 
is to be expected of the Law therefore, is a rejection of this policy rationale and a 
consequent stabilization of the system.  
 
 THE QUESTION OF FAIRNESS 
 
Fairness is a critical element of the principle of legality and provides a useful context for 
understanding the legal validity of any policy. Applying a holistic approach to 
constitutional interpretation, clear problems relating to fairness emerge from the gender 
policy. Article 23 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana requires all administrative bodies to 
be fair and candid in the exercise of their discretion. Following it up with article 296 (b), 
it can be observed that fairness imposes a duty not to be “arbitrary, bias or capricious”. 
 
                                                                                                                              65 
It is humbly submitted that the University of Ghana’s gender policy sins against all these 
three indicators of fairness in the following ways. First, the biasness of the policy is 
reflected in the fact that it applies to the system selectively and not holistically. For 
example, table 2 above shows that as many as about 82% of students admitted in the 
health sciences are females and only about 18% are males. This huge under-
representation of males in the health sciences has received no remedy. However, women 
under-representation in other fields has provided a basis for implementing affirmative 
action policy throughout the entire system. This selective application constitutes biasness 
and renders the policy unfair. 
 
How arbitrary is the policy? In this vein, it is worth noting that the policy in itself lacks 
clarity, and focus. The gender affirmative action policy is not captured in the student’s 
handbook, which clearly states all the modes of admission to the university. Neither is it 
referred to in the statutes of the University. Meanwhile no clear guidelines have been 
issued by the University council as to the mode of implementing this policy and the 
considerations. The basis of this policy can be found only in preparatory materials, such 
as Academic board minutes approving the policy (see appendix 2). These minutes do not 
specify clearly the modalities for implementation. Moreover, there is no factual basis for 
a blanket application of the policy across the system. It can be inferred from table 3 that 
the proportion of females admitted to courses in the humanities in proportion to the 
number of female applicants is greater than the number of males admitted in relation to 
male applicants. This information is useful because humanities provide the largest 
amount of admission spaces every year in the University of Ghana. Against this 
background, it can be seen that the sustained application of affirmative action policies 
across the system is not justified. 
 
Another twist to its arbitrary nature is the fact that it does not conform to any system of 
logic. Assuming it is a reality that women were being discriminated against as a result of 
certain socio-cultural practices and hence suffer some educational disadvantages, should 
that be a basis to make a male university applicant pay for obnoxious cultural practices 
which he may be innocent of? Of course not. Legal rationality and precedent lean 
                                                                                                                              66 
towards individual civil and criminal responsibility. Even where liabilities arise as a 
result of group action, the liability of each of the members of the group must be 
independently established. It therefore amounts to arbitrariness to impose the failures of 
society on individuals. It is even more arbitrary to intend to solve the problem of 
exclusion or discrimination through discrimination. The act of discriminating against 
males in order to include more women does not uproot the problem of discrimination 
altogether from society, it only exchanges one kind of discrimination for another. 
 
The capricious nature of the policy can also not be disputed; it is given to lots of 
inconsistency in its implementation. For example, even though the Academic board 
decision referred to a two point increase in favor of women, it has not been implemented 
homogenously across programmes. For example, in table 4, cut off points for females 
oscillated between a one point and two point differences from that of males (Ofosu, 
2006). Clearly, a pattern of inconsistency can be discerned. 
 
Is it possible for the University to circumvent the consitutional challenge of fairness by 
raising issues of its rights to autonomy as spelt out in the University of Ghana Act 
(1961)?  Is it possible for the University to escape these challenges by raising issues of its 
powers to make statutes for the running of the University under section 15 of the Act? 
The answer to both questions is a big No. Any statutes flowing from the University Act is 
subject to the review powers of the Courts and as per article one of the Constitutions can 
be declared void by the Supreme Court of Ghana to the extent of its inconsistency. Thus, 
no policy or legal argument can avail the University if such argument clearly falls short 
of the fairness requirements imposed by the constitution. 
 
To conclude this section, it is worth saying that within the framework of the principles of 
legality, it may be difficult to reconcile the object of remedying social discrimination and 
the demands imposed by Law. It is in this regard that the filter may be more inclined to 
restore the system to the status quo ante. 
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 BALANCE/DIVERSITY RATIONALE  
 
Also worth analyzing is the Balance/diversity rationale within the framework set by the 
filter model. It will be right to start by admitting that legal precedents appear to wholly 
support these interrelated rationale(s) in principle. In the Bakke case, Justice Powell 
stated clearly that the diversity rationale justifies the use of affirmative action policies. 
This position was followed in the two University of Michigan cases. Nevertheless, the 
courts have been quick to apply a so-called narrow tailoring analysis to these rationale(s). 
In the case of Gratz and Bollinger (one of the two Michigan cases), the emphasis was on 
ensuring that a not “too large a benefit” has been given to the so-called beneficiaries and 
that no disproportion results to the disadvantage of non-beneficiaries. “Disproportion” 
appears to have been defined in the decision in relation to the weight of points given to an 
individual for belonging to a disadvantaged group. It was the observation of the court that 
a 20 points allocation to minorities out of 150 is too large, rendering the policy not 
sufficiently narrowly tailored.  
 
Drawing analogies to the Ghanaian scenario serious problems can be foreseen. A two 
point increase in favour of women as evidenced in the policy document in my view offers 
a very disproportionate benefit. Bearing in mind the observation of Ofosu (2006) who 
states that at least 400 women benefited from the affirmative action policy in 2004/2005 
academic year, it is possible to construe a “too large a benefit” for women. 400 places 
constitute a little over 10% of the number of male students who were rejected in 2006 
(rejected male applicants added up to 3,880). In my view such a concession for women is 
relatively too large assuming a similar amount of advantage was granted to women in 
2006. 
 
Another dimension of the narrow tailoring analysis which fixes the gender policy is its 
insistence on similar admission procedures for all applicants. In the Hopwood v Texas 
case, the court invalidated the Law school’s admission programme because it provided 
separate tracks and procedures for so-called disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged 
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applicants. This must be distinguished from Justice Powell’s plus factor as defined in the 
Bakke case. The plus factor requires that an applicant is given a plus for being a minority, 
and then subsequently his entire qualifications are compared against the entire pool of 
applicants.  
 
On the other hand, separate admission procedures make a person’s race or gender the 
determinative factor in admissions programme or the sole basis for making a person 
eligible for a certain kind of treatment. More precisely, the case for setting separate 
admission criteria was completely rejected by the courts in Johnson v. University of 
Georgia. It is in this context that the Ghanaian Balance rationale may have problems. By 
setting different admission cut-off points for each gender, it appears patently that the 
University seeks to make gender too important a consideration in defining the admission 
procedures. Bearing in mind the narrow tailoring analysis as an important filter 
ingredient, one may rightly surmise that the legal validity of this rationale may be under 
question. 
 
More importantly, the Georgia decision suggests that the diversity rationale can only 
justify gender/race based affirmative action policies if there are no other means of 
achieving diversity. In other words, it must be proven that race or gender neutral methods 
for achieving diversity do not exist or are not in sight. Simply put, the court requires 
proponents of such a policy to answer the question: Are there no better ways of achieving 
the same results apart from giving preferential treatment to one group? In the context of 
the University of Ghana, it is my humble submission that using gender policies to 
enhance women representation ignores other useful solutions to the same problem, if not 
misses the problem entirely. The real problem appears to be limited access and not 
equity. Drawing from Ofosu (2006), who observes that at least every year close to 2000 
qualified applicants (who meet the minimum entry requirement) are rejected, it can be 
estimated using the male-female admission ratio of 58:42, that at least 840 qualified 
females who meet the minimum entry requirement are rejected every year; this number is 
greater than the number of females admitted through the affirmative action policy.  
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Resultantly, a paradox is born: the University claims to be implementing a policy to boost 
the representation of women while at the same time its admission regime rejects qualified 
women. It is in this regard that it sounds more reasonable to expand access rather than to 
pursue a hollow policy of equity.  
 
It is possible to raise the excuse of resource inadequacy in an effort to pass the narrow 
tailoring test, but this excuse will not avail the University because if that is the case then 
the policy focus has been misplaced. The University may be queried for not focusing its 
energies on resource mobilization rather than on equity policies.  
 
 THE LESS ENDOWED SCHOOLS POLICY 
     
The social justice rationale appears to legitimize the less endowed schools policy on its 
face. Indeed, the directive principles of state policy in the Ghanaian Constitution as well 
as the preamble to the Constitution cited earlier in the work, seek to create a social order 
founded on social justice. That fact notwithstanding, social justice as a concept is vague 
and lacks definitional accuracy. It is for this reason that its use as a rationale is 
circumscribed by parameters set by Law. 
 
In the Ghanaian context, students from less endowed schools are referred to as deprived 
of the minimum educational benefits that can enable them to make competitive grades for 
admission into higher education institutions. Be that as it may, it is suggested that 
allocating to them 300 spaces as discernible from the academic board decision (see 
appendix 2) is very much required to create an equal playing field for all. 
 
Good as this intentions may be, it is submitted that this policy constitutes a quota policy; 
a technique which has been considered by the courts as an invalid means of implementing 
an affirmative action policy. In the Bakke case, sixteen places were reserved for students 
who had indicated that they were “educationally/economically disadvantaged”. The 
American Supreme Court observed that there is no basis for implementing a rigid quota 
policy because it isolates other important considerations in the admissions process. 
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Professor Archibald Cox, who argued out the Bakke case in favor of the University of 
California-Davis, derived three conclusions from the court’s decisions.  
 
(1) Quotas may not be used to reserve a fixed number of spots for minority students. 
 
(2) Simply converting a particular programme from quota into goals will not protect a 
particular programme from challenge. 
 
(3) Separate admissions committees may not be used, students must be evaluated by the 
same committee (Bakke Case).  
 
Cox, analysis points out that no matter which way a quota policy is formulated or 
implemented, it can’t escape the strict scrutiny of the courts. 
Decisions following the Bakke case, such as the two Michigan cases, have clearly 
disapproved of the quota policy and have validated a policy sometimes based on the 
extent to which it can distinguish itself from a quota policy. In the Grutter v. Bollinger 
case, for example, the sixth circuit attempted to distinguish between a quota policy and a 
policy that enrolls a critical mass. In the view of the court, the former is clearly invalid 
but the latter can pass the validity test.  
 
In the light of the above, it is clear that there is no basis in precedent to justify a quota 
based affirmative action policy. Therefore when the University of Ghana introduces a 
quota based policy as a means to an end, it is clearly failing to apply itself to legal 
standards set by the narrow tailoring analysis. 
 
The less endowed schools policy must also conform to the instrumental test. If it claims 
to promote the interest of the economically and socially disadvantaged then the 
appropriate question to ask is:  
Who is socially and economically disadvantaged?  Does attending a less endowed school 
necessarily make a person disadvantaged and therefore more limited in terms of life 
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chances? Logically thinking, it is possible to find the economically disadvantaged in well 
endowed schools because of excellent academic performance. 
 
It is also possible to find people from rich families in such less endowed schools whose 
parents can afford extra tuition and additional educational facilities to support their 
studies. It is for this reason that the policy in my view seems to be inadequate in 
addressing the general problem of the socio-economically disadvantaged student.  
 
Why doesn’t it target disadvantaged students in general both from well- and less-
endowed schools? The case of Indira Sawhney v. Union of India, illustrates how such 
skewed approaches to disadvantaged groups can present legal difficulties. In that case, 
the Supreme Court of India was quick to observe that scholarship packages targeted at 
disadvantaged groups do not necessarily apply to every individual belonging to that 
group. It established a two tier test.  
 
First the applicant must belong to the group and second the applicant must satisfy the 
purposes for which the scholarship was instituted. In this vein, it is worth asking: do all 
students proceeding from a less endowed school need a scholarship? (Since the 
scholarship is need based).  
 
It is evident that some of these students are wards of rich cocoa farmers and attended 
these schools for reasons of geographical proximity (Ofosu, 2006). Thus making meaning 
of this policy in the context of the Indira Sawhney test, one may have cause to question 
the social justice rationale; there may be recipients of this advantage who are not 
necessarily disadvantaged. 
 
Another interesting dimension to the problem is its application to only less endowed 
secondary schools. Knowing that educational disadvantages accumulate and linger on, it 
may be problematic to apply the policy only to students who attended a less endowed 
senior secondary school. What about those who attended less endowed junior secondary 
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schools? Isn’t it reasonably deducible that the educational disadvantages suffered in 
lower secondary may have affected their performance at the senior secondary level?  
 
Lack of answers to these questions, makes the less endowed schools policy highly 
problematic. Clearly, the policy fails to bring itself within the requirement of the 
instrumental test which requires a reasonable proof of the problem solving value of a 
policy. 
 INTER POLICY COHESION 
 
At this stage I seek to answer the question: How do equity-like policies in the University 
of Ghana jell when considered as a composite unit? Answer to this question is important 
for two reasons.  
First, these two policies discussed above can fail the instrumental test on grounds that the 
rationale of other co-existing equity-like policies at the University of Ghana contradicts 
their rationale. Or taking both policies together they fail to communicate the rationale 
they stand for individually. 
 
To begin this analysis, it appears that the policy does not contemplate the fact that both 
policies can inure to the benefit of an individual concurrently. Being a woman from a less 
endowed school, such an individual has two benefits. First she can be considered as a less 
endowed student, and second she can be considered as a woman. Viewed in this way the 
two policies may overlap to offer unreasonably large benefits to a particular individual 
sinning against the narrow tailoring analysis which requires limited preferential treatment 
as much as possible. 
 
The concessionary admissions policy of the University of Ghana presents another serious 
threat to its equity-like policies, if the admission policy of the University is reviewed by 
the courts as a whole. Under the concessionary admissions, wards of lecturers and staff of 
the University of Ghana are allowed to present their wards for admission once they have 
met the minimum entry requirements.  
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In other words, the cut-off point for various programmes is relaxed for wards of 
professors and other staff of the University. Well intended as this policy may be, it casts a 
slur on the equity rationales championed by the University, such as the social justice 
argument. Wards of University professors are relatively well endowed in terms of their 
socio-economic positions, – to whom much is given much must be expected if social 
justice will not remain a mere rhetoric. By granting their wards access under more 
flexible conditions, admission policy appears to rather skew in favour of the strong rather 
than the vulnerable.  
 
Thus, a clear contradiction emerges: Does the social justice rationale justifying the less 
endowed school policy jell or fit well within the mechanics of the University of Ghana 
admission policy? If not, as can be inferred from the above, then the social justice 
purpose cannot be served by such a policy. The instrumental test may therefore not play 
to the advantage of the less endowed schools policy. 
 
It is also crucial to ask the question whether these policies from a more social and 
psychological perspective cohere, or help to achieve the larger social policy objectives of 
equality, female empowerment and the like. Does it empower women or does it dis-
empower them? Does it empower the disadvantaged, such as people from less endowed 
schools, or does it only confirm and sustain feelings of inferiority?  
 
In this regard, Justice Powell, in the famous Bakke case, did observe “preferential 
programmes may only reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups are 
unable to achieve success without protection based on a factor having no relationship to 
individual worth”. Powell’s observation points to the personal inadequacies those 
individual beneficiaries may face, thinking that, for such policies they couldn’t have 
achieved their individual successes.  
 
At the societal level, doubts may be created in the minds of those who would be the 
individual’s clients, patients, customers, etc., as to the individual’s true abilities and 
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capabilities. In sum, such policies may create a huge obstacle for members of the 
disadvantaged group in their quest and attempt to achieve genuine equality.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
6  CONCLUSIONS 
6.1  WHAT CAN WE EXPECT FROM THE COURTS? 
 
In the preceding discussions, an attempt has been made to explore the central features of 
the gender affirmative action policy and the less endowed schools policy. Within the 
“Law as a filter” analytical framework, the study has progressed by examining the central 
legal constraints, namely the principles of legality constructed from the Constitution, and 
the narrow tailoring test as well as the instrumental test largely set by case Law. 
 
Against this background, the study has measured these two policies to ascertain the extent 
to which they can “filter through” the test of Law and cause their intended changes or 
otherwise. Four findings were obvious from the study. 
 
First it was noticed that the gender policy of the University fails to apply itself to non-
discrimination – a critical value of the principle of legality. In that, by using group centric 
perspectives to justify affirmative action policies that discriminate against individuals, the 
policy fails to bring itself within the constitutional perspective of rights. The Constitution 
adopts a strictly individual centered approach to rights protection. 
 
It also fails to satisfy the standards of fairness – another critical element of the principle 
of legality. Fairness as set out in the Ghanaian Constitution imposes a duty not to be 
biased, capricious or arbitrary in exercising administrative discretions. Conversely, the 
University of Ghana gender policy applies the policy selectively to the system, paying no 
attention to the fact that males are under-represented in certain sections of the system. It 
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also fails to set clear rules and guidelines for the implementation of the policy and pays 
limited attention to the factual deficits of the policy.   
 
It also flowed from the study that the diversity/passive representation rationale does not 
adequately fit into the caveats set by the courts even though justified in principle. For 
example, it was deciphered based on factual evidence from tables 2 and 3 that the policy 
runs the danger of granting disproportionate benefits to women. More grave was the fact 
that the policy selects women under a different criterion. This was viewed to lack legal 
validity under the authority of the decision in the University of Georgia case. 
 
More importantly, it came out that the real problem may have been misidentified. Using 
factual information presented in chapter three, it became obvious that expanding access 
for women should be the critical policy issue and not the implementation of equity 
policies. It was, for example, established that the number of women who meet the 
minimum entry requirement every year and are turned down is larger than the number of 
women who benefit from affirmative action policies. 
 
Taken all the arguments supporting the gender policy together and fitting it within the 
filter model, it appeared that the principles of legality exemplified by principles such as 
fairness and non discrimination, the narrow tailoring analysis as exemplified by the case 
law and the instrumental test negate the validity of this policy. Within the framework of 
the filter model therefore, it is to be expected that the gender policy will be filtered out if 
a legal test is put up. Its capability for social change is therefore under question. The 
court is expected to lean towards social stability rather than social change. 
 
Also discussed was the legal basis of the less endowed schools policy. The policy, it was 
observed, is strongly justified by its proponents in the context of social justice objectives.  
It was noticed that the purposes of the policy may fail because it may end up benefiting 
students who are not actually socio-economically disadvantaged and sidelining those who 
are in fact disadvantaged. In this vein it was established that belonging to a disadvantaged 
social category does not necessarily make one disadvantaged. 
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More importantly it was noted that the so-called less endowed schools policy is 
implemented through a quota regime. Such a regime offends the narrow tailoring analysis 
espoused in decisions such as Bakke. The clear stipulation of 300 spaces for less 
endowed students, it was noted, does not fit any acceptable legal precedent.  
 
The problem of who is less endowed was also brought to bear as the key definitional 
difficulty of this policy. It was concluded that by making “less endowed” applicable only 
to students from less endowed senior secondary schools, the policy gives a blind eye to 
lingering educational difficulties which may affect future performance. Thus, it fails to 
remedy the disadvantages of a less endowed student in the real sense. 
 
Put together, it can be observed that the critical requirements of the instrumental test and 
the narrow tailoring analysis are not satisfied by the less endowed schools policy. In the 
sense that it fails to adequately address the problems it purports to solve and adopt 
procedures that give “too large an advantage” to the so-called disadvantaged group. The 
expected behavior of the courts within the framework of the filter model will be to block 
this policy and ensure a return to the status quo ante. 
 
The study went further to examine the various components of the University of Ghana 
admissions policy and how it makes sense as a composite unit. In this sense, strong 
contradictions were identified. It was, for example, seen that the concessionary 
admissions policy in itself mirrors social injustice and cannot be reconciled with the 
social justice rationale of the less endowed school policy. 
 
It was also realized that a double benefit may accrue to an individual based on gender and 
school attended which may give rise to a disproportionate benefit. Finally, it was 
observed that the deeper social policy objective of ensuring equality may not be achieved 
after all, because of very deep psychological and social problems that may arise from 
implementing policies of this kind. 
 
                                                                                                                              78 
Fitting these composite issues into the filter model it became obvious that the social 
justice rationale and the social policy objective of equality may fail the instrumental test 
because they clearly fail to remedy the problem they claim to remedy. In this context we 
expect the court to prefer social stability over social change. 
6.2 WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
 
Having clearly exposed the legal difficulties that flow from the two policies initiated by 
the University of Ghana, the question that immediately follows is “What alternatives can 
be put in place to achieve the same goals?” What follows are suggestions that if 
implemented can work to achieve the rationales advanced by these policies. 
 
One way of tackling the legal difficulties, is for Institutions to lobby for the Incorporation 
of Clauses that mandates affirmative action in the Constitution. Such is the case in 
Jurisdictions like Uganda.  The constitutional provision must include a claw back clause 
that will exclude the application of non-discrimination /equal protection clauses to 
affirmative action policies. By so doing, constitutional questions such as the degree of 
fairness and reasonableness of such policies will not arise, because fairness will be 
interpreted to include affirmative action. Institutions must however be mindful of the 
inherent rigidity in legislations as discussed earlier in this work when adopting this 
approach. 
 
In relation to the less endowed schools policy, dispensing benefits on the basis of socio-
economic disadvantage, rather than the category of school an applicant attended, will 
provide a more credible basis for meeting the social justice rationale. Socio-economic 
disadvantage must be measured based on a clear criteria that is largely based on the 
extent and level of need and not mere institutional affiliation. Since most poor people are 
likely to end up in less deprived schools because of less competitive scores, a 
disadvantaged tailored policy, will necessarily have a beneficial impact on students from 
less endowed schools. At the same time it allows disadvantaged people who find 
themselves in well endowed schools to be catered for. This also eliminates the latent 
problems in defining what constitutes a less endowed school and who qualifies as a 
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student from a less endowed school. In the nutshell it provides a more logically coherent 
basis for justifying the less endowed schools policy.   
 
Also, knowing that majority of students from less endowed schools are exposed to some 
educational disadvantages, it will be useful that these students are exposed to 
developmental and enrichment programmes in the early years of their education. These 
programmes are often available to most students in well endowed locations. The benefits 
of such programmes will be reaped at the lower levels so that at higher levels these 
students can compete on the basis of merit and not on preferential treatment. This will go 
a long way to eliminate the feelings of inferiority that sometimes attaches to beneficiaries 
of affirmative action.  
 
In relation to the gender based policy, it is suggested that attention should be paid to 
individual characteristics in the selection process rather than to group characteristics. 
Additional weight can be given to other qualifications, such as exceptional personal 
talents, unique work or service experience, leadership potential, maturity, demonstrated 
compassion, a history of overcoming disadvantage, etc. These indicators can equally 
provide a basis for giving a plus to a student rather than gender which is more 
controversial. 
 
Another dimension of the solution is basing admissions on a selective test that is gender 
neutral. Standardized tests have been criticized for statistically preferring men over 
women, and for having a built in cultural bias (see: Elson, 1989 standardized test-helpful 
or harmful PTA Today, March 1989 at 28, 29 &30). University of Ghana admissions 
make use of performance in the West African Examination Council Examinations which 
are largely standardized, in order to be able to easily select students.  Benefits from 
administrative convenience should not be allowed to justify the use of standardized tests 
when they have been shown to prefer one gender over the other. To this end, the problem 
can be remedied by developing other examination models that are gender neutral. 
Alternatively, the existing test can be made more gender neutral in its approach. Equity-
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like policies are not the answer, the answer lies in a re-examination of the mechanics of 
admission. 
 
In sum, it is the opinion of the author that group tailored affirmative action programmes, 
no matter which form and content, are not the best way to achieve the rationales of non-
discrimination and social justice. The strict scrutiny approach adopted by the courts and 
the heavy demands imposed by the Constitution make it very difficult to legally justify 
such affirmative action policies, no matter their intent and purposes. Consequently, it is 
suggested that more individual based approaches to equity as advanced in this section 
should be adopted: admission processes should be based on applying as in Justice Sandra 
O’Connor’s words  
“A highly individualized and holistic review of applicant’s file, giving serious 
consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational 
environment." (In Grutter v Bollinger) 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
EXTRACTS FROM THE AKWESI AGYEMAN CASE 
 
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE  
IN THE AUTOMATED FAST TRACK HIGH COURT, ACCRA HELD  
ON TUESDAY THE 13TH DAY OF JUNE, 2006 BEFORE HIS  
LORDSHIP JUSTICE PAUL BAFFOE BONNIE  
 
SUIT NO.AP.1712006  
 
THE REPUBLIC 
 
VERSUS: 
 
I.UNIVERSITY OF .GHANA  
2. THE ACTING VICE CHANCELLOR  
UNIVERSITY OF GHANA  
EX-PARTE: (1)PROFESSOR EDWARD OFORl  
                          SARPONG  
          (2) PROFESSOR... KWASI AGYEMAN  
...................................................................................................................................... 
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LIBRARY  
 
FACULTY OF LAW  
UNIVERSITY-OFGHANA  
RULING  
 
In this application for JUDICIAL REVIEW the applicants are claiming  
against the Respondents amongst other things;  
 
1.  a. CERTIORARI to quash the Decision to  
Remove Professor Ofori Sarpong ...as Pro Vice  
Chancellor of the 1st Respondent University as contained in second Respondents 
letter of February 6th 2006.  
 
b.  The decision to dismiss the 2nd applicant Professor Kwesi Agyeman from the       
University of Ghana as contained in letter dated 6th February, 2006 from 2nd 
Respondent to second applicant, or in the alternative, 
2. (ii) A declaration that the purported removal of  
Professor Ofori Sarpong (Pro Vice Chancellor) by  
the acting Vice Chancellor is ultra vires and or  
unlawful and or unauthorized.  
(iv) A declaration that the purported dismissal of the  
second applicant by second respondent is wrong in  
law, unauthorized and beyond the powers or  
authority of the second respondent.  
 
BACKGROUND  
Following leakages and alleged malpractices at the University of  
Ghana in the course of the 2004 -2005 academic year examinations,  
a committee, which later came to be known as "Mfodwo Committee",  
was set up to investigate these allegations of leakages and  
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examination malpractices. After the investigation and report, a  
Disciplinary Board was set up for senior members of the University.  
The first applicant, Professor Owusu Sarpong, was at all material  
Times, The Pro-Vice Chancellor of the University while the 2nd   
Applicant Professor Kwasi AGYEMAN was the Head of the  
Philosophy Department.  
The Disciplinary Board invited the two applicants by separate letters to  
 respond to allegations of Misconduct made against them. The  
applicants responded to these written allegations and also appeared  
before the disciplinary board where representations were made on  
their behalf. Then followed the completion and submission of the  
committee's findings to the Vice Chancellor. The report showed that  
the Disciplinary Board made some findings against the two applicants  
herein, and made some recommendations of sanctions to be imposed  
on them. Purporting to act on these recommendations, the Ag. Vice  
Chancellor wrote two letters to the first applicant and one letter to the  
2nd applicant. For clarity I will like to quote excerpts of these letters.  
 
The first letter to the 1'' Applicant was dated February 6, 2006 and  
titled "REPRIMAND". It read;  
"... FoIlowing My acceptance 0-f the recommendation of the  
Disciplinary Board for Senior Members, I write to  
reprimand you for your failure to exercise good  
judgment, which embarrassed the University.  
I hope a repetition of the lapse will not occur in future’’.  
On the same date the 1st Applicant has served with another  
letter written on the same day and that contained the following  
among other things;  
Dear Sir,  
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DISCIPLINARY BOARD FOR SENIOR MEMBERS  
I write in respect of the above. I have finally received the  
report of the Disciplinary Board for Senior Members.  
The Disciplinary Board by a majority decision of 4-2  
found you guilty of the charges and recommended thus:  
"that a reprimand be written under section 43 (c). In  
addition, the Defendant be removed from the office of  
pro-vice chancellor"  
I have considered the recommendations of the Disciplinary  
Board, the substance of their decision and I am satisfied  
that they have come to the proper conclusion and I endorse  
their recommendations.  
Therefore by this letter, I am applying the sanctions and  
you are hereby removed as the pro-vice chancellor with  
immediate effect  
The 3rd letter written on the same 6th February, this time to the 2nd  
applicant had wording similar to that in the 2nd letter to the 1st  applicant  
referred to above but concluded thus:  
"The Disciplinary Board by a majority decision of 5 -7,  
found you guilty of the charges and the  
recommendations of the Board are as follows:  
1 That the defendant's conduct in indulging in Fraudulent  
award of unearned marks and grades has shown him as  
one who lacks the necessary integrity required of a  
person entrusted with the assessment of students and  
the handling of examination processes in a University.  
2 That he be sanctioned according to Section 43(a) of the  
statutes of the University to outright dismissal from the  
University as he cannot handle the office of examiner  
with the requisite level of integrity".  
I have considered the recommendations of the  
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Disciplinary Board, the substance of their decisions and  
1 am satisfied that they have come to the proper  
conclusion and l endorse their recommendation.  
Therefore, by this letter, l am applying the sanctions and  
you are hereby dismissed form the University, with  
immediate effect’’  
This in a nutshell is the background of the case that has resulted in this  
application for Judicial Review by the two professors.  
 
CASE FOR THE APPLICANTS:  
1
st
 APPLICANT -PROF OFORI SARPONG.  
 
The case of the 1st Applicant is simple. It is true that the Mfodwo  
Committee was set up to do some investigations. Following that a  
disciplinary board was set up to which he was invited. However the 1st  
Applicant's problem is with the fact of his removal from the position he  
 
occupies as Pro-vice chancellor. It is his case that THE UNIVERSITY  
OF GHANA was established by an enactment Act 79 of 1961 as a  
corporate body. That by SECTION 15 of the said Act, statutes may be  
enacted by the University Council for carrying into effect the provisions  
of the Act. Pursuant to this section of the Act a document titled THE  
STATUTES OF THE UNIVERSITY has been passed and is the basis  
of all activities of the University since August, 2004.  
It is explicitly stated in the statutes Section 7 (7) that  
"The provisions on the removal of the vice chancellor shall  
applv to the removal of the Pro-Vice Chancellor". Section 6 (19)  
sets out in detail the grounds for which, and the procedure by which, a  
Vice-Chancellor (or as in this case a Pro-Vice Chancellor) may be  
removed.  
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By ignoring the laid down procedure and arrogating to himself  
the power to remove the 1'' Applicant from his position as Pro-vice  
chancellor, the 2nd Respondent usurped the powers reserved to the  
University Council. The 1st  Applicant was denied his right to be heard  
by a competent body i.e. a committee to be set up by council, and  
finally that the Actions of the Vice chancellor was in flagrant violation  
of Article 23 of the 1992 constitution which enjoins Administrative  
Bodies and Officials to act fairly and reasonably and comply with the  
requirements imposed on them by law.  
To this end therefore, the 2nd Respondent acted Ultra Vires and  
made his decision amenable to be quashed by certiorari.  
 
THE DEFENCE:  
In response the respondents submitted that:  
'They admit that the 1st  Applicant was the Pro-Vice Chancellor  
appointed pursuant to Section 7 of the statutes. They also admit that  
there are clear provisions in the statutes for the removal of Pro-Vice  
Chancellor which are co-terrninous with those of the Vice-Chancellor  
set out by Section 6(191 of the statutes.  
However, the respondent submitted that "with the  
overwhelming evidence against him, the 1
st
 Applicant was  
properly sanctioned by the Respondents" because;  
 
a. "The procedure referred to in Section 6(79) of the  
statutes is applicable only when a person is to be  
removed in respect of his functions and in his  
capacity as Pro-vice chancellor. In the case of the  
applicant, the allegations of misconduct made  
against him were made in his capacity as a senior  
member of the University and not as the Pro-Vice  
Chancellor of the University. "Counsel submitted  
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that; "When one takes a look at the letter inviting him  
to appear before the Disciplinary Board one sees  
that, he was invited to respond to the allegations of  
misconduct in respect of the conduct of examination  
whose grading he interfered with, at the time he was  
not the examiner for that paper".  
 
The application in respect of the 1'' applicant should be  
therefore dismissed.  
 
THE DECISION:  
REMOVAL 
I find the attempt made by counsel of the Respondent to defend  
the action of the Ag. Vice Chancellor with regard to the Removal of the  
Pro-Vice Chancellor, rather half hearted, feeble and unconvincing.  
Perhaps it is as well, because right away, I will say the action is not  
defensible. Maybe what counsel should have done was to have  
honourably conceded and advised his clients to go back to the drawing  
board. I will justify this assessment of counsel's efforts presently  
 
Article 23 of the 1992 Constitution reads:  
"Administrative Bodies and Administrative officials shall  
act fairly and reasonably and comply with the  
requirements imposed on them by law and persons  
aggrieved by the exercise of such acts and decisions  
shall have the right to seek redress before a court or  
other tribunal  
 
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to comment on Article  
-23 oft he constitution in the case of AWUNl v. WEST AFRICA  
EXAMINATION COUNCIL (2003-2004) SC GLR 471. As to what is  
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meant by the phrase to "act fairly and reasonablyJJ Kpenah J.S.C. in  
his opinion said at page 489.  
"The phrase to act fairly and reasonably in my opinion  
necessarily imports a duty to observe the common law  
maxim of AUDl ALTERAM PARTEM and other principles of  
natural justice which is very much part of our  
jurisprudence and are implicit in the constitutional  
provisions in Article 23. Because I cannot contemplate  
how a person could be said to have acted fairly and  
reasonably if he did not give either notice or hearing to  
another who was entitled to such-notice or hearing  
before taking a decision which adversely affects his  
rights; neither can I contemplate a situation where a  
person could be said to have acted fairly and reasonably  
if he acted as a judge in his own cause, or gave a biased  
and perverse decision’’ 
The facts of this case were briefly that the entire results of 13  
students' were cancelled and a 3-year ban imposed on them. Their  
offence was that;  
 
1. All thirteen candidates had been involved in some  
examination malpractices or irregulaties in Core Maths  
Paper and  
2. Judging from a scrutiny of the answer scripts of the  
candidates, the council had concluded that the  
candidates had foreknowledge of the questions and had  
colluded among themselves in solving the questions.  
 
The petitions by their headmaster and their solicitor were ignored.  
So they brought an action at the high court. They denied the  
collusion charge ... against them and said their not being asked to  
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make representation infringed their fundamental human rights and  
that the council failed to act fairly and reasonably as required by  
Article 23.ofthe Constitution.  
It was argued on behalf of the council that the evidence in the  
scripts was so manifest that by its rules it was unnecessary for the  
council to invite the appellants to make any representation and that  
"the cancellation of examination result on good grounds does  
not constitute an infringement of human rights’'.  
The High Court upheld their Claim, the Court of Appeal reversed it  
and they appealed to the supreme Court. The Supreme Court held  
 
1  "By failing to observe the rules of natural justice, i.e. the  
AUDI ALTERAM PATEM rule, the respondent council had  
contravened the appellants right to administrative justice  
under Article 23 of the 1992 Constitution.  
Furthermore the process by which the council sought to  
establish the allegations made against the appellants  
was neither fair nor reasonable and therefore made in  
contravention of Article 23.. . .. "  
The Supreme Court in an earlier case of ABOAGYE vs.  
GHANA COMMERCIAL BANK LTD., (2001 -20021 SG GLR 797  
had done more than enforce the observance of Administrative  
justice in terms of Articles 23 in as far as it relates to the AUDI  
ALTERAM PARTEM RULE.  
 
The facts of this case were similar to those in the case of  
AWUNI, cited earlier in as far as it relates to notice of hearing.  
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The plaintiff, a senior manager of the G.C.B. received two  
queries relating to payments off 15,000 and $13,000 into the bank  
accounts of two customers. He answered the queries admitting that  
he had authorized the payments in the course of his normal duties.  
The bank, however took the view that the payments had been  
fraudulently authorized. The plaintiff was therefore suspended from  
work.  
Three (3) levels of disciplinary boards went into this matter  
made various recommendations and finally he was dismissed. The  
three levels were Disciplinary Committee, that made  
recommendation to Executive Committee, which considered the  
report and recommendations and also made recommendation to  
the Disciplinary Board of the Bank i.e. the BOARD OF THE BANK,  
that also reviewed the report and recommendation and finally took  
the decision that the plaintiff should be dismissed, after taking  
notice of "the extent of the plaintiffs involvement in the  
malpractices at the Foreign Operations Branch  
Significantly, apart from the query he was served with, the  
plaintiff was not invited to or given any hearing before any of the  
three committees or levels ,of disciplinary board!  
His claim before the high court alleging breach of natural justice  
was upheld. The court of Appeal reversed the high court. On further  
appeal to the Supreme Court, the appeal was unanimously upheld.  
The court held that all courts and adjudicating bodies and  
authorities were required under Article 19(13) of the 1992  
Constitution to give a fair hearing within a reasonable time. This is  
what BAMFORD ADD0 JSC. Said on Article 19(13).  
"This requires that notice of proceedings be given to the  
person affected by any decision of the adjudicating  
authority and that he be given the opportunity to defend  
himself. Furthermore, Article 23 says that administrative  
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bodies and officials shall act fairly. And acting fairly  
 
implies the application of the rules of natural justice, which  
have been elevated to constitutional rights and are  
binding on all adjudicating and administrative bodies as  
well as courts and tribunals"  
 
Later in the judgment BAMFORD ADD0 J.S.C. commenting on  
the breach of fair play contrary to the Audi Alarm Pattern rule said  
at page 805.  
"In this case the administrative body trying the plaintiff,  
who suffered the highest and toughest sanction of  
dismissal, should in the course of fair trial have served him  
with proper disciplinary charges and given adequate  
notice of the date of hearing as well as be given the  
opportunity to be heard. The mere fact that the rules of the  
bank did not mention this does not relieve the  
defendant of the duty to comply with' the rules of natural  
' justice and fair trial"  
 
More appropriately Adiabenq J.S.C. also said this at paqe 816  
"It is clear from rule .?:?of the Defendant bank staff rules  
that the Plaintiff was entitled not only to a hearing, but a  
personal hearing. Giving him-a query would not, by  
stretch of the imagination, be the same as giving him  
personal hearing ..."  
I have referred copiously to the Supreme Court decision in the  
AWUNl and the ABOAGYE CASES, because even though the  
facts in those cases seem to be slightly different, the similarities in  
the issues discussed and the principles contained therein cannot be  
lost on the court.  
                                                                                                                              101 
 
While in the AWUNI case the applicants were not given any  
form of hearing at all because of what the WAEC said was due to  
"Administrative convenience", in the Aboagye case he was given  
a form of hearing when he was asked to respond to a query. The  
court in both cases said that no hearing or  
inadequate hearing amounted to a denial of the respective plaintiffs'  
right to fair hearing……….. 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
EXTRACTS FROM UNIVERSITY OF GHANA POLICY SOURCES 
 
ACADEMIC BOARD MINUTES  
3/2003-2004, Dated February 20, 2004 
 
COMMITTEE TO STREAMLINE ADMISSIONS PROCEDURES 
 
By a letter dated September 15, 2003, the Vice Chancellor empanelled a Committee to 
deliberate on “some outstanding issues” of the University’s admissions policy and make 
recommendations for consideration by the Executive committee and Academic Board. 
 
 
2) TERMS OF REFERENCE 
 
The Committee had the following terms of Reference: 
 
2) To suggest cut-off aggregates for concession admissions (Children/wards of University 
of Ghana staff, of other public Universities and friends of the University) 
 
 
4) To examine the Affirmative action for the admission of girls being implemented and 
also deliberate on and make suggestions for affirmative action for candidates from 
disadvantaged schools; 
 
 
9.0 RECCOMENDATIONS 
 
The effective date of wards of members of staff benefiting from concessionary 
admissions should be reviewed from the current period of six months to two years from 
the date of registration to eliminate abuse. 
 
The policy on affirmative action for female applicants should continue. A policy of 
affirmative action for should be implemented, on clearly stated guidelines in this report 
with effect from 2004-2005 academic year. Admissions of all categories should be done 
by the academic board. 
 
 
The Board gave definite approval to the following: 
 
Less Endowed Schools: 
Affirmative action is granted to 300 applicants from Less Endowed Schools as certified 
by the Ghana Education Service. The Interfaculty committee was charged with the 
responsibility of working out the details for implementation. 
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The Scheme was to commence in 2004/2005, and should be reviewed after every five 
years of implementation. 
 
Concessionary Admissions to Sister Universities: 
 
Concessionary admission for sister Universities should be given on reciprocal basis. 
Under this agreement, admission into competitive programmes should attract two points 
below the cut-off point. 
 
The effective date of wards of members of staff benefiting from concessionary 
admissions is reviewed from the current period of six months to two years from the date 
of registration, to eliminate abuse.  
 
  
ACADEMIC BOARD MINUTES 3/90-91: Dated May 30
th
 1991. 
 
INTERACULTY COMMITTEE TO ADVISE ON POLICY AND PLAN FOR THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 
3.1: The inter faculty committee observed the sex ratio of admission into the University 
currently to be about 80:20 in favor of males. 
 
It noted that this skewed ratio could be attributed to the following: 
 
1v) Cultural Bias against formal training of girls, particularly at the high level of 
education; 
 
Early marriages and attendant maternal roles which disrupt education. 
 
3.3 In the light of the above the University rationalization committee recommendation of 
a sex ratio of 50:50 will be difficult to achieve.  
 
 
 
         RECCOMMENDATION 
 
3.4 Recognizing that girls are at a disadvantage socially and bearing in mind Dr 
Aggreys Dictum that if you “educate a woman and you educate a nation” there is a 
need to have more educated women to serve as role models in the society. We there 
fore recommend the following as a means of increasing female intake into the 
university. 
1) The cut off point for admission for females into the University should be pegged 
at two points lower than that that fixed for males. The minimum requirement for 
admission should however be satisfied. 
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2) As a long term measure, efforts should be made through education to change 
society’s perception of women’s roles in society and thereby eliminate cultural 
prejudices of women. 
 
